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INTRODUCTION

The last two decades have witnessed an astounding transformation of
the international legal landscape as the international community has created
a series of courts and tribunals to prosecute those accused of genocide, war

crimes, and crimes against humanity. As a consequence of this international
institution building, prosecutions are currently underway for crimes committed across the globe: in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Cambodia, among other places.
These international criminal tribunals and particularly the first modern tribunal-the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY)-have undergone two significant evolutions. One of these is widely
known; the other, little known. The widely known evolution concerns the
procedural and evidentiary rules governing tribunal proceedings. Whereas
the ICTY's initial rules of procedure and evidence were almost exclusively

adversarial in character, the tribunal later added a number of nonadversarial
elements.' Subsequent tribunals have incorporated nonadversarial features
from their outsets, so that international criminal procedure-to the extent
*
Cabell Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful to Mark
Drumbl and Peter Robinson for their comments on an earlier draft. Any mistakes are my own.
1. I prefer the term nonadversarialover inquisitorialbecause the latter, particularly in
the past, "conjure[d] up the excesses of the Star Chamber or the haunting memories of the
Spanish Inquisition." G.E.P. Brouwer, Inquisitorialand Adversary Procedures-A Comparative Analysis, 55 AUSTL. L.J. 207, 208 (1981); see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 93-94 (1988) (remarking that "[tlhe label 'inquisitorial'.
evokes images of the auto-da-fd and the Iron Maiden, the Pit and the Pendulum").
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such a body of law can be said to exist across tribunals-is now considered
to be something of a blended procedural system. 2 The lesser-known evolution concerns the rules governing the initiation and termination of defense
representation. At the ICTY's inception, little regulation of those matters
existed. Early ICTY defendants were given broad discretion to select the
defense counsel of their choice, to fire the defense counsel they had previously selected, and to refuse the assistance of defense counsel entirely.
Current defendants retain much discretion, but in recent years the ICTY and
the later tribunals have adopted rules restricting defendants' choices in several important respects.
These two evolutions are seemingly unrelated, and the motivations giving rise to them are seemingly simple to discern. Early trials at the ICTY
and its sister tribunal-the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR)-were extraordinarily lengthy and expensive.3 Because Continental
trials featuring nonadversarial procedures typically give rise to shorter, more
efficient proceedings than their common law adversarial counterparts, 4 the
tribunals adopted some nonadversarial procedures in the hopes of reducing
the length and cost of their trials.5 Some of the restrictions lately imposed

2.
Kai Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: "Adversarial," "Inquisitorial" or
Mixed?, 3 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2003).
3.
Numerous scholars and practitioners have commented on the slow pace and high
cost of tribunal trials. See, e.g., INT'L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REP. No. 3 o , THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA: JUSTICE DELAYED, at ii (2001) [hereinafter JUSTICE
DELAYED], available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/rwanda/
030-intemational-criminal-tribunal-for-rwanda-justice-delayed.aspx; John E. Ackerman, Assignment of Defense Counsel at the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN
HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK McDONALD 167, 170 (Richard May et a]. eds., 2001) [hereinafter ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE]; Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness:
Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 545, 622-23 (1998); Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the Operation and Functioning of the
International Criminal Tribunals, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 759 (2000); Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 321, 368-69 (1999); Patrick L. Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, II EUR. J. INT'L L. 569,
584 (2000); Patricia M. Wald, To "Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence": The
Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 535, 536 (2001).
4.
See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 539, 627 (1990); John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal
Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1562 (1978).
5.
Vladimir Tochilovsky, Legal Systems and Culture in the International Criminal
Court: The Experience from the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, in
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW:

627, 632 (Horst Fischer et a]. eds., 2001); Mhximo Langer, The

Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 886-905
(2005); Mdiximo Langer & Joseph W. Doherty, Managerial Judging Goes International but Its
Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the ICTY Reforms, 36 YALE J.
INT'L L. 241, 242-52 (2011) (noting the ICTY's attempts to expedite proceedings by imple-
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on the defendant's ability to hire and fire counsel also were motivated by
efficiency concerns, but an additional factor driving the adoption of those
restrictions was the desire to improve the quality of defense representation.6
Many early defendants, particularly at the ICTY, received inadequate representation because they selected counsel who were unfamiliar with

international criminal law, unfamiliar with the tribunal's adversarial procedures, and were not even fluent in the tribunal's working languages.
Although the above explanations do in fact explain at a superficial level
the evolutions I have just summarily described, I argue here that these evo-

lutions reflect an underlying and far more fundamental evolution in
international criminal justice as a whole-the evolution from a novel, vulnerable, and distrusted criminal justice system to a rapidly maturing
criminal justice system that possesses considerable credibility and legitimacy. Consider the first modem international tribunal: the ICTY. Established

while the Balkans wars were in full swing by an international community
that wanted to do something but not too much, the ICTY was, at its inception, an extraordinarily fragile and weak institution.7 It did not have
sufficient funding; 8 it did not have enough employees; 9 it did not have the

ability to gain custody over its indictees; ° and it most certainly did not have
the respect (or fear) of the leaders of the former Yugoslavia," I as evidenced
menting nonadversarial procedures, but concluding that the reforms did not have their desired
effect).
6.
See Prosecutor v. egelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion
for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Segelj with His Defence, 21 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY] May 9, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
seselj/tdec/en/030509.htm; U.N. Secretary-General, Comprehensive Report on the Progress
Made by the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia in Reforming Its Legal Aid System, TT 51, 54, delivered to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/58/288 (Aug. 12,
2003) [hereinafter Comprehensive Report]; KARIM A.A. KHAN & RODNEY DIXON, ARCHBOLD
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE

& EVIDENCE §§ 20-85, 20-94 (Sir

Adrian Fulford ed., 3d ed. 2009); Mark S. Ellis, The Evolution of Defense Counsel Appearing
Before the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV.
949, 950-57 (2003); Sonja B. Starr, Ensuring Defense Counsel Competence at International
CriminalTribunals, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 169, 188-89 (2009).
7.
PIERRE HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 43-64 (James Thomas Snyder
trans., 2004).
8.
See infra text accompanying note 254.
9.
For instance, it took more than a year for the Security Council to agree on a prosecutor. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 75-79 (1997); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER
MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

210-12 (1996);

RICHARD

J.

GOLDSTONE, ON HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR

CRIMES INVESTIGATOR 20-24 (2000); Bernard D. Meltzer, War Crimes: The Nuremberg Trial
and the Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 895, 908 (1996) (noting the

ICTY's "serious underfunding and understaffing").
10.
For a discussion of the ICTY's difficulties in obtaining custody over defendants, see
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Problems, Obstacles and Achievements of the ICTY, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 558, 559-6,7 (2004).
1I.
HAZAN, supra note 7, at 47.
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by their perpetration of the Srebrenica massacre two years after the tribunal
was established. Indeed, the ICTY was initially so weak and vulnerable that
many feared it would never get off the ground 12 or that the Dayton Peace
Accords, which spelled the end to the Bosnian War, would also spell the end
to the ICTY. 13

As it happened, the ICTY not only survived but developed into a
credible institution that set in motion an international criminal justice
revolution. The tribunal's internal transformation stemmed primarily from
an infusion of resources and enforcement support. Whereas the tribunal's
budget in 1996 was a paltry $35.4 million,"n by 2004, the ICTY had 1180

employees15 and a yearly budget of approximately $150 million. 16 As for
enforcement, whereas early tribunal indictments were routinely ignored
both by the states of the former Yugoslavia as well as by United Nations
(U.N.) peacekeepers, 17 by 2004 the international community was making a
credible effort through various mechanisms to assist the ICTY in obtaining
custody over its indictees. 11 Consequently, by mid-2011, all of the ICTY's
indictees had been apprehended.19 Concededly, the ICTY is still subject to

criticism-for the length and cost of its trials and for its limited success in
reconciling the peoples of the former Yugoslavia,20 among other
12.
Id. at 43-52.
13.
Payam Akhavan, The Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace
Agreement and Beyond, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 259, 267-70 (1996); HAZAN, supra note 7, at 6769. For other predictions of failure, see Anthony D'Amato, Editorial Comment, Peace vs.
Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 500, 501-02 (1994).
14.
ICTY President, Third Annual Report of the InternationalTribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, transmitted by Note of the
Secretary-General, 132, U.N. Doc. A/51/292-S/1996/665 (Aug. 16, 1996).
15.
ICTY President, Eleventh Annual Report of the InternationalTribunalforthe Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, transmitted by Note of the
Secretary-General, [383, U.N. Doc. A/59/215-S/2004/627 (Aug. 13, 2004).
16.
Id. 382. The tribunal's 2004-2005 biennium budget was $298,226,300. Id.
17.
See infra text accompanying notes 254-260.
18.
See, e.g., CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS WITH
HUMANITY'S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY 316-20 (2009); DIANE F.
ORENTLICHER, OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, SHRINKING THE SPACE FOR DENIAL: THE

ICTY IN SERBIA, 33-35 (2008).
19.
Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of the Office of the Prosecutor,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the Arrest of Goran Hadlid,
OTP/MOW/PRI428e (July 20, 2011), http://www.icty.org/sid/10734.
20.
See, e.g., ERIC STOVER, THE WITNESSES: WAR CRIMES AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE 117-25 (2005); Marie-Benedicte Dembour & Emily Haslan, Silencing
Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 151, 172-75 (2004);
Laurel Fletcher & Harvey Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution
of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 597-601 (2002); Geoffrey Nice & Philippe
Vallires-Roland, ProceduralInnovations in War Crime Trials, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 354,
355 (2005).
IMPACT OF THE
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things 21-but it has developed into a credible judicial institution that will
have continuing and significant influence in the states of the former
Yugoslavia and in the development of international criminal law.
Outside of the tribunal's walls, the ICTY has been a progenitor of "one
of the more extensive waves of institution-building in modern international
relations. '22 International criminal law (if such a discipline could be said to
have existed at all) had fallen into desuetude during the nearly fifty years
that followed the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, and
it was the ICTY that revived it. Providing both ideological inspiration and
practical guidance, the ICTY spawned the creation of numerous other bodies to prosecute international crimes, and in doing so effected a sea change
in prevailing views about the need and desirability for criminal accountability following mass atrocities. Admittedly, the field of international criminal
law continues to face myriad challenges, but it is now unquestionably a field
and one that is expected to endure. The International Criminal Court (ICC)
is in full swing, having survived the early and vehement opposition of the
United States. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is successfully
completing its trials, having gained custody of virtually all of those it labeled most responsible for the Sierra Leonean violence, including former
Liberian President Charles Taylor. 3 The Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) have just convicted their first defendant,24 and
Special Tributhe most recent international tribunal to be established-the
5
nal for Lebanon (STL)-has just issued its first indictment.
These developments, occurring both within the ICTY and outside it,
were the necessary conditions for the procedural and defense counsel evolutions that I will explore in more detail below. In particular, I will show that,
as a consequence of the ICTY's initial, highly vulnerable status, the tribunal
had no choice but to adopt adversarial procedures and to grant defendants
virtually free rein in selecting the lawyers who would advocate on their behalf. In 1993, when the ICTY was established, it was not only novel, weak,
and vulnerable, but it was also deeply distrusted by the people of the former
Yugoslavia. The Serbs considered the tribunal a politically driven court

See Ivan Simonovi6, Dealing with the Legacy of Past War Crimes and Human
21.
Rights Abuses, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 701, 706-07 (2004) (addressing other problems with the
ICTY, including getting states to fulfill their mandates, diminished media coverage, and the
reduced psychological impact from holding distant trials).
22.
MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2007).
23.
See About the Special Court for Sierra Leone, SCSL, http://www.scsl.org/ABOUT/tabid/70/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment,
24.
559 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia [ECCC] July 26, 2010), http://
www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/20100726_JudgementCase 001_ENG
_PUBLIC.pdf.
25.
Hariri Tribunal: UN Prosecutor Issues Sealed Indictment, BBC (Jan. 17, 2011,
8:54 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 12209122.
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established to unfairly target them for prosecutions.2 6 The Bosnian Muslims
considered it the empty gesture of an international community that was un2
willing to take truly effective measures to end the wary.
No one knew
exactly what the ICTY would do, but no one had confidence that it would
do the right thing. Under these circumstances, the tribunal had no choice but

to adopt adversarial procedures.
I will contrast adversarial with nonadversarial procedural systems in
some detail in Part III, but suffice it to say here that adversarial systems are
largely party driven whereas nonadversarial systems are largely judge
driven. Because adversarial systems are party driven, they are understood to
28
provide criminal defendants the "fullest voice possible" in their cases.
Affording this participation is thought to advance litigant dignity and
autonomy

29

and largely explains why adversarial procedures are considered

better suited than their nonadversarial counterparts to criminal justice
systems that feature a large proportion of minority defendants or defendants
who otherwise have reason to distrust the state.3 °

ICTY defendants-along with entire populations of their supporterswere extraordinarily distrustful of the ICTY, and as a consequence, the
Itribunal had no choice but to adopt procedures that acknowledged this distrust and permitted defendants to give voice to it. The very fact that
26.

See, e.g., DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, OPEN Soc'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE & INT'L CTR.

FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THAT SOMEONE GUILTY BE PUNISHED: THE IMPACT OF THE

ICTY INBOSNIA 50 (2010); Rodney Dixon, New Developments in the InternationalCriminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia: ProminentLeaders Indicted and JurisdictionEstablished,
8 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 449, 452 (1995); Elizabeth Sullivan, Expert Charges War Crimes Often
Escape Prosecution, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 20, 1994, at 11 A; War Crimes: International
War Crimes Tribunal Built on Shaky Justice, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov.
25, 1994.
27.
See ORENTLICHER, supra note 26, at 24; Steve Coll, In the Shadow of the Holocaust, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1994, at J8; see also ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY,
GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 112 (1998) (arguing that creation of the
ICTY "was a substitute for effective action to halt Serb depredations in BosniaHerzegovina").
28.
Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64
IND. L.J. 301, 317-18 (1989). Lon Fuller believed, for instance, that according litigants "a
participation in the decision that is reached" constituted "the essence of the adversary system."
Lon Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30, 41 (Harold Joseph Berman ed., 1961).
29.
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 3, 8 (1975);
LUBAN, supra note 1, at 85; Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 459
(2009); Sward, supra note 28, at 302, 310, 318, 324.
30.
See, e.g., STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND
DEFENSE 51 (1984); KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 444 (1962); Craig M. Bradley, The
Convergence of the Continental and the Common Law Model of Criminal Procedure,7 CRIM.
L.F. 471, 472, 482 (1996); Nico Jirg et al., Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 47, 48, 54 (Phil Fennell
et al. eds., 1995); cf Erik Luna, A Placefor Comparative Criminal Procedure, 42 BRANDEIS
L.J. 277, 300 (2004) (contrasting "the civil law tradition [that] was not forged in an abiding
distrust of centralized authority").
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nonadversarial procedures are thought to be premised on the notion that
"the state is the benevolent and most powerful protector and guarantor of
public interest and can ... be trusted to 'police' itself'' shows just how ill
fitting and discordant nonadversarial procedures would have been for the
early ICTY given the distrust that pervaded its proceedings.
Adversarial procedures not only proved to be a far better ideological fit
for the ICTY in its early years as it sought to gain credibility and legitimacy,
but they also helped the tribunal to gain credibility and legitimacy. In recent
decades, social psychology research has shown that litigants who believe
their cases to be decided pursuant to fair procedures are both more inclined
to accept and obey negative decisions and also to hold more positive views
about legal officials and the judicial system as a whole.3 2 Even more importantly for the ICTY, studies also show that "people decide how
legitimate authorities are, and how much to defer to those authorities and
their decisions primarily by assessing the fairness of their decision-making
procedures."33 Thus, it is crucial for fledgling courts and other institutions
that are seeking to enhance their legitimacy to use decision-making procedures that are considered fair.34
That, then, requires us to ask: What decision-making procedures are
considered fair? Studies show a number of factors to be particularly influential in individual assessments of fairness,3" but key among these is litigant
participation in the proceedings. Specifically, "procedures that vest process
control in those affected by the outcome of the procedure are viewed as
more fair than are procedures that vest process control in the decision maker.' 36 These fairness assessments might be relevant to any criminal justice
system, but to the ICTY, they were crucial: to be considered fair and to
thereby gain credibility and legitimacy, the ICTY had to adopt procedures
that would allow for significant defendant participation.
Because adversarial procedures allow for considerably more party participation than nonadversarial procedures, it seems obvious that adversarial
procedures have greater potential to legitimate a fledgling and vulnerable
court such as the ICTY. This conclusion follows, however, only if party participation can be equated with lawyer participation, for most criminal cases

31.
Jorg et al., supra note 30, at 44; see also MIRJAN R. DAMA9KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO LEGAL PROCESS 173 (1986).
32.
E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 70-71 (1988).
33.
Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT'L J. PSYCH. 117, 120
(2000); see also E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and CorporateDispute Resolution, 38 ADMIN.
ScI. Q. 224, 226, 240, 246 (1993).
34.
RICHARD SPARKS ET AL., PRISONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 87-90 (1996);
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 109-12 (1990); Tyler, supra note 33, at 120-21.
35.

Lind et al., supra note 33, at 226; Tyler, supra note 33, at 121.

36.

LIND

& TYLER, supra note 32, at 35.
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are presented not by the criminal defendant himself but by his lawyer.37 In
the domestic context, equating the goals of the defendant with those of the
lawyer is usually unobjectionable: although a lawyer's financial incentives
can sometimes cause her goals to diverge from those of her clients,3 8 most
domestic defendants seek either an acquittal or a low sentence upon conviction, and most criminal defense lawyers steadfastly pursue those ends on
behalf of their clients. Indeed, the role of the lawyer constructed by the adversarial system-as a fiercely partisan, unerringly loyal advocate-is the
means through which the defendant's "voice" is heard during the proceedings.
At the outset of the ICTY, however, one could not reasonably equate the
goals of ICTY defendants with those of their lawyers. ICTY defendants
were far less likely than their domestic counterparts to seek the "best possible outcome" as defined by acquittals and sentences, and, even when they
did, they were far more likely than their domestic counterparts to seek those
goals through means that traditional defense counsel would be unwilling to
pursue. Consequently, merely assigning a competent lawyer to an ICTY
defendant would not necessarily result in the defendant's being heard or
feeling heard. And it is this likely goal divergence that underpinned the
ICTY's initial failure to regulate defense counsel. Because an identity of
interest could not be presumed between ICTY defendants and their counsel,
the ICTY provided defendants maximum possible choice in the hiring, firing, and eschewing of defense counsel. Some of the lawyers that early
ICTY defendants selected may not have been competent in the traditional
sense of the term, but they did espouse their clients' worldview, and by allowing defendants to select them, the ICTY enhanced its legitimacy. Only
later, when the ICTY was a stronger, more credible institution could it begin
both to impose reasonable restrictions on the defendants' choice of counsel
and to introduce nonadversarial elements that limited the overall role of
counsel.
Part I of this Article traces the evolution in ICTY procedures from the
purely adversarial to a blended system in which adversarial procedures still
dominate but are mediated by various nonadversarial elements. This evolution has been treated at length elsewhere, so my description will be
summary. By contrast, the evolution in the regulation of defense counsel has
received little scholarly attention, so Part II explicates that phenomenon in
more detail. As noted, these evolutions can be understood as stemming from
mundane, easy-to-understand motivations: the desire to expedite proceed37.
Of course, in keeping with their enhanced concern for litigant autonomy, adversarial systems typically bestow on defendants broad rights of self-representation, and these I will
discuss infra Part II.
38.
See, e.g., Frank H. Stephen et al., Incentives, Criminal Defense Lawyers and Plea
Bargaining,28 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 212 (2008); Peter W. Tague, Guilty Pleas and Barristers'Incentives:Lessons from England, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 287, 287 (2007) (comparing
British barristers to their American counterparts who are, it is argued, more likely to pursue
their own narrow self-interest in the plea process).
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ings and to improve the quality of defense representation. Part III, however,

looks beneath those surface explanations to explore the far more fundamental evolution that constituted the necessary precondition for the procedural

and regulatory evolutions described in the earlier parts: an evolution that
saw the maturing and legitimating of both the ICTY and international criminal justice as a whole.
I.

THE PROCEDURAL EVOLUTION

The ICTY's first set of procedural rules was substantially adversarial in
character. Largely modeled on a draft provided by the U.S. Department of
Justice, 39 the initial ICTY rules created a neutral, largely passive role for the

judges and bestowed on the parties primary authority for developing their
cases and presenting their evidence at trial. In particular, the rules adopted a
"two-case" system in which the prosecution and defense each presented
their best arguments and evidence to the judges and each challenged the
other side's evidence. 40 The initial rules did permit tribunal judges to take
some active fact-finding steps by authorizing them to summon their own
witnesses, 41 ask their own questions, 42 and alter the order of evidence

presentation "in the interests of justice."43 However, the judges were expected to, and did in fact, use these powers sparingly. As Miximo Langer
summarized: "The judges conceived of themselves, and generally behaved,

as passive umpires.... [And] the Rules generally made the parties the most
active actors in the criminal proceedings." 44
Early tribunal proceedings under these rules were lengthier and costlier
than anyone considered optimal,45 and many commentators placed a large
share of the blame on the adversarial nature of ICTY proceedings. 46 More
specifically, ICTY judges, along with a United Nations Expert Group, iden-

tified the judges' failure to adequately control proceedings as causing

39.
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 384 (2003); VIRGINIA MORRIS
& MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 177 (1995); Theodor Meron, ProceduralEvolution in the ICTY, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 520, 522 (2004).
40.
See Langer & Doherty, supra note 5, at 248-49; see also CHRISTOPH J.M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 223 (2001).
41.
ICTY R. P. & EVID. 98, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 2 (Oct. 4, 1994) (as amended) [hereinafter ICTY RPE 1994].
42.
Id. R. 85(B).
43.
Id. R. 85(A).
44.
Langer, supra note 5, at 858-59; see also Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a
Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 77, U.N. Doc A/54/634
(Nov. 22, 1999) [hereinafter U.N. Expert Report].
45.
CASSESE, supra note 39, at 385.
46.
Eg., id. at 442; Langer, supra note 5, at 872-74.
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substantial delay.47 Consequently, the Expert Group advised the chambers
"to take a more active role in trials by questioning counsel and witnesses,
cutting off irrelevant or repetitive testimony and excluding witnesses whose
testimony is cumulative or of no material assistance with respect to disputed
issues. 48
The ICTY followed the Expert Group's recommendations. In particular,
between 1998 and 2003, the ICTY introduced into its proceedings pretrial
judges, status conferences, and pretrial conferences, all of which both
streamlined the proceedings and armed the Trial Chambers with information, enabling them to exercise greater control over their cases. The
pretrial judges, for instance, coordinate communication between the parties,
prepare the case for a fair and expeditious trial, and ensure that no party
unduly delays the proceedings.49 Pursuant to rules authorizing them to conduct status conferences 0 and to order the parties to file pretrial briefs,
witness lists, and exhibits lists, among other documents, 51 pretrial judges
gather information that enables them to record the points of agreement and
disagreement over facts and law and then present that information to the
Trial Chamber. 2 Later amendments to the ICTY's procedural rules have
required pretrial judges also to establish a work plan that sets forth the parties' obligations and the dates upon which they must be met.53 Still later rule
amendments permitted the Trial Chamber to exercise considerable control
over the shape and substance of the case by authorizing them to limit the
number of witnesses a party can call, to limit the amount of time a party can
use at trial, and even to limit the "number of crime sites or incidents comprised in one or more of the charges. 54
Many commentators have described these new procedural elements as
nonadversarial,5 5 although Mdximo Langer has convincingly argued that
47.

U.N. Expert Report, supra note 44, IT 76-77.

48.
Id. [76.
49.
ICTY R. P. & EvID. 65ter (B), U.N. Doc. fT/32/Rev. 17 (Dec. 7, 1999) (as amended) [hereinafter ICTY RPE 1999].
50.
Id. R. 65bis (A).
51.
Id. R. 65ter (E)-(G); see also ICTY R. P. & EVID. 90(G), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 28
(July 28, 2003) (as amended) [hereinafter ICTY RPE 2003] (authorizing a Trial Chamber to
"refuse to hear a witness whose name does not appear" on the witness list).
52.
53.
54.
55.

ICTY RPE 1999, supra note 49, R. 65ter (H), (K).
ICTY RPE 2003, supra note 51, R. 65ter (D).

Id. R. 73bis (C)(i), (ii).
See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 39, at 386-87; SALVATORE ZAPPAL,, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 2 (2003) (observing that "practice evidenced the drawbacks of applying a purely accusatorial model to international criminal
proceedings" so that in amending the ICTY's procedural rules "some inquisitorial elements
were upheld, thereby diluting the originally adversarial imprint"); Gideon Boas, Creating
Laws of Evidence for InternationalCriminal Law: ICTY and the Principle of Flexibility, 12
CRIM. L.F. 41, 57-58 (2001); Alphons Orie, Accusatorial v. InquisitorialApproach in International Criminal Proceedings Prior to the Establishment of the ICC and in the Proceedings
Before the ICC, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
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they in fact constitute a move toward managerial judging.5 6 Labels aside, the

relevant point for our purposes is that the amendments redistributed some
process control from the ICTY's parties to its judges. Following the reforms, the parties had less control over which witnesses to call and how
much time to spend questioning them. Moreover, the parties had to contend
with a better informed judiciary that had been strongly encouraged to take
charge of the proceedings in a variety of ways.
Also relevant for our discussion is that this trend toward greater judicial
control accelerated with the creation of subsequent international tribunals.

ICC and STL procedures contain far more nonadversarial elements than
appear even in the reformed ICTY procedures, and ECCC procedures are
based almost entirely on the French nonadversarial system; consequently,
ICC, STL, and ECCC judges are authorized to exercise far greater control
over their proceedings. The ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber, for instance, is not

limited to streamlining its cases and facilitating communication between the
parties, but also has some investigative authority that is reminiscent of pretrial judges in certain Continental jurisdictions.57 Moreover, ICC Trial
Chambers are authorized to "give directions for the conduct of proceedings;"58 thus, the Presiding Judge can adopt either a civil-law style trial in

which judicial questioning dominates or a common-law style trial in which
party questioning dominates.5

9

The STL Statute goes further, establishing as

a default presumption a nonadversarial mode of hearing witnesses in which
the judges take the lead in witness questioning,6" so long as "the Trial
Chamber is provided with a complete file" that would enable it to be
COMMENTARY

1439, 1492-93 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter ICC

COMMEN-

Tochilovsky, supra note 5,at 631-32.
56.
For Langer's discussion of the many differences between managerial judging and
nonadversarial judging, see Langer, supra note 5, at 877-85. One key difference is that
whereas "the inquisitorial system presumes an official investigation that impartial officials
conduct to find the truth, the managerial judging system conceives of procedure as a device
that the court uses with (even involuntary) collaboration and coordination from the parties to
process cases as swiftly as possible." Id. at 878.
57.
For instance, the Pre-Trial Chamber can issue an order on its own initiative to preserve evidence that would be essential for the defense at trial but is at risk of becoming
unavailable. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 56(3), openedfor signature
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also id. art. 57 (delineating
additional investigative powers).
58.
Id. art. 64(8)(b).
59.
Rule 140(2)(c) of the ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence reflects this flexibility by permitting a Trial Chamber "to question a witness before or after a witness is
questioned" by a party. ICC R. P. & EvID. 140(2)(c), Assembly of States Parties, 1st Sess.,
Sept. 3-10, 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter ICC RPE].
60.
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon art. 20(2), S.C. Res. 1757, Attachment,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757, at 19 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter STL Statute]. Article 20(2) of the
STL Statute provides that "[u]nless otherwise decided by the Trial Chamber in the interests of
justice, examination of witnesses shall commence with questions posed by the presiding
judge, followed by questions posed by other members of the Trial Chamber, the Prosecutor
and the Defence." Id.
TARY];

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 33:321

familiar with the facts and evidence.6' Finally, ECCC procedures are almost
exclusively nonadversarial, so ECCC judges are responsible for calling witnesses and conducting the bulk of the questioning at trial.6 2 Thus, whereas
international criminal procedures began at the ICTY with a "strong adversarial orientation," 63 the recent introduction of substantial nonadversarial
elements into the procedures of all of the international tribunals has trans64
formed international criminal procedure law into a "truly mixed" system.

II. THE

EVOLUTION IN THE REGULATION OF

LAWYER SELECTION AND DISCHARGE

The procedural evolution just described is relatively well known. By
contrast, the focus of this Part-the evolution in the regulation of the lawyer-client relationship at the international tribunals-has escaped scholarly
attention. My primary focus here is the ICTY because its practice is the
most developed, but I also discuss the law and practice of the other international tribunals as available. I show here that in the ICTY's early days, the
tribunal offered defendants an almost limitless choice regarding who, if anyone, would represent them. It did so by imposing virtually no
qualifications requirements on counsel who wished to practice before the
ICTY, by permitting defendants to fire their lawyers virtually at will, by
allowing defendants to consent to even the most troubling conflicts of interest, and by accommodating defendants' desires to self-represent despite
considerable disruption to trial proceedings. In recent years, however, the
ICTY has imposed restrictions in each of these areas. Subsequent tribunals
have followed this trend, either by adopting more restrictive policies at their
outsets or by imposing similar or more robust restrictions than the ICTY.

61.
STL PRESIDENT, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (AS OF 10 NOVEMBER 2009):
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 28 (2009), available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/
rules-of-procedure-and-evidence/rules-of-procedure-and-evidence-explanatory-memorandumby-the-tribunal-s-president-10-november-2009; see also STL R. P. & EVID. 145, STL/BD/
2009/01/Rev. 3 (Nov. 29, 2010) (as amended) [hereinafter STL RPE].
62.
See, e.g., ECCC INTERNAL R. 87(4) (Rev. 8) (Aug. 3, 2011) (as amended), http://
www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/egal-documents/ECCC%201nternal%2ORules%20(Rev.8)
%20English.pdf [hereinafter ECCC INTERNAL RULES] (giving the Trial Chamber broad
authority to "summon or hear any person as a witness or admit any new evidence which it
deems conducive to ascertaining the truth"); id. R. 93 (allowing the Trial Chamber to "at any
time, order additional investigations" whenever the Trial Chamber "considers that a new investigation is necessary"); id. R. 80(1)-(2) (entitling the parties to submit to the Trial
Chamber a list of witnesses they would like to summon); id. R. 84 (giving the accused the
absolute right to have summoned "witnesses against him ... whom the Accused had no opportunity to examine during the pre-trial stage"); id. R. 80bis (2) (acknowledging, however,
that with respect to other witnesses, the Trial Chamber can determine that "the hearing of a
proposed witness or expert would not be conducive to the good administration of justice" and
for that reason "reject the request that such person be summoned").
63.
Langer & Doherty, supra note 5, at 245.
64.
Ambos, supra note 2, at 34-37.
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A. Selecting Counsel

The vast majority of international criminal defendants do not have the
means to pay for retained counsel,6 5 so virtually every defense lawyer ap66

pearing before the tribunals has been appointed at the tribunals' expense.

Although human rights law does not require the tribunals to provide indigent defendants with a choice of counsel, 67 the tribunals have endeavored to

do so in most cases. 68 Typically, the Registry (or the Defense Office, where
one exists) will provide defendants with a list of approved counsel from
which the defendant may make a selection.69 The Trial Chambers have held
65.
E.g., ICTR Financial Rep. and Audited Financial Statements for the Biennium
Ended 31 December 2005 and Rep. of the Board of Auditors, 54, U.N. Doc. A/61/5/Add. 11
(SUPP); GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 5K (July 28, 2006); KHAN & DIXON, supra note 6,
§ 20-32 (describing the indigency of ICC defendants and suspects); Christian Rohde, Legal
Aid and Defense Matters, in ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 543-44 (Rodney Dixon et al. eds., 1st ed. 2003) ("About 95 percent of
all persons represented before the ICTY have been assigned legal counsel on the basis of legal
aid .... ); David Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 975, 978 (2003) ("[O]ver 95% of the defendants who have appeared before the
ITCY have been compensated under the legal aid system."); Richard J. Witson, Assigned Defense Counsel in Domestic andInternationalWar Crimes Tribunals: The Need for a Structural
Approach, 2 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 145, 170 (2002) ("The Rwandan Tribunal reports that every
defendant appearing before that court has asserted legal indigence.").
Tribunal defendants are entitled to free legal assistance if they do not have the
66.
means to pay for it. See Rome Statute, supra note 57, art. 55(2)(C); Updated Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 21(4)(d), originally established
by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute], available
STL Statute,
at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute-sept09_en.pdf;
supra note 60, art. 16(4)(d); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 17(4)(d), U.N.
Doc. S/2002/246, App. II Attachment, at 29, 39 (Mar. 8, 2002) [hereinafter SCSL Statute];
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 4, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, art. 35(d), ECCC Doc. No. NS/RKMIIO04/006
(Council of Jurists & the Secretariat of the Task Force trans., Oct. 27, 2004) (amended Aug.
26, 2007) [hereinafter ECCC Statute], availableat http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/
legal-documents/KR Law as-amended.27.Oct_2004_Eng.pdf.
67.
See Croissant v. Germany, 237 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 29 (1992); Human Rights
Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5 Paragraph 4 of the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Forty-Third Session Concerning Communication No. 283/1988, 8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988 (Nov. 19,
1991); Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5 Paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
10.5, U.N. Doc.
Forty-Third Session Concerning Communication No. 459/1991,
CCPR/C/55/D/459/1991 (Nov. 8, 1995).
Steven Kay & Bert Swart, The Role of the Defence, in ICC COMMENTARY, supra
68.
note 55, at 1421, 1430-31.
69.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, 1 62 (June 1,
2001); Prosecutor v. Delalid, Mucic, Delic & Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Re2 (ICTY June 24, 1996);
quest by Accused Mucid for Assignment of New Counsel,
Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-T & ICTR-96-17-T, Decision on the
Motions of the Accused for Replacement of Assigned Counsel/Corr. (June 11, 1997). The
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that the registrar is not required to appoint the defendant's chosen counsel,70
but so long as that counsel is either on the list or eligible to be placed on the
list, then he or she should ordinarily be appointed "unless the Registrar has
reasonable and valid grounds" for denying the defendant's request.71 These

appointment practices have not changed significantly over the years, so defendants remain entitled to be represented by the counsel they select from
the registrar's list so long as the registrar has no valid grounds for denying

the defendant's selection. What has changed markedly, however, is the criteria for being placed on the registrar's list and the conflict of interest rules
that now supply new grounds for a denial of the defendant's selection.
1. Qualifications Requirements
Each of the tribunals, except for the ICC, applies sets of qualifications
requirements to counsel who are retained by a defendant that are different
from those applied to counsel who are appointed by the tribunal for an indigent defendant.72 However, because virtually every international defendant
ICTY Trial Chambers have spoken approvingly of the registrar's practice, observing that, as a
general matter, "the choice of any accused regarding his Defence Counsel ... should be respected unless there exist well-founded reasons not to assign Counsel of choice." Prosecutor v.
Martic, Case No. IT-95-1 1-PT, Decision on Appeal Against Decision of Registry (ICTY Aug.
2, 2002).
70.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, T 61; Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Kabiligi,
N'Tabakuze & Nsengiyumva, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Maitre Paul Skolnik's
Application for Reconsideration of the Chamber's Decision to Instruct the Registrar to Assign
Him as Lead Counsel for Gratien Kabiligi, 21 (Mar. 24, 2005); Kambanda v. Prosecutor,
Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Judgement, 33 (Oct. 19, 2000); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon &
Gbao (Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Case), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Written Reasons
for Decision on Application of Third Accused to Dispense with the Mandate of Court Appointed Counsel, Mr. Andreas O'Shea, 20 (Dec. 6, 2007).
71.
Ntakirutimana,Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-T & ICTR-96-17-T, at 6; see also Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) Case), Case No.
SCSL-2004-16-AR73, Decision on Brima-Kamara Defense Appeal Motion Against Trial
Chamber II Majority Decision on Extremely Urgent Confidential Joint Motion for the Reappointment of Kevin Metzger and Wilbur Harris as Lead Counsel for Alex Tamba Brima and
Brima Bazzy Kamara, 89 (Dec. 8, 2005); Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-T &
ICTR-96-17-T, IN 5-6 (separate and dissenting opinion of Ostrovsky, J., on the request of the
accused for change of assigned counsel); Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, 20; Reasons for
the "Decision on the 'Application for Review of Decision of the Registrar's Division of Victims and Counsel dated 2 January 2008 not to Admit Prof. Dr. Sluiter to the List of Counsel,'"
24, ICC Doc. No. ICC-Pres-RoC72-0t-8 (July 10, 2008); Decision on the "Demande urgent
en vertu de la R~glement de procedure et de prevue" and on the "Urgent Request for Appointment of Duty Counsel" Filed by Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Before the Presidency on 7 May
and 10 May Respectively, TT 24-25, ICC Doc. No. ICC-01/04-01/06-937 (June 29, 2007).
72.
For the differing ICTY rules, compare ICTY R. P. & EVID. 44(A) (Dec. 8, 2010)
(as amended) [hereinafter ICTY RPE 20101, with id. R. 45(B), and ICTY Directive on the
Assignment of Defence Counsel, art. 14(A), Directive No. 1/94, as amended, U.N. Doc.
IT/73/Rev. 11 (July 11, 2006) [hereinafter ICTY Directive 2006]. For the differing ICTR
rules, compare ICTR R. P. & EvID. 44(A) (Oct. 1, 2009) (as amended) [hereinafter ICTR RPE
2009], with id. R. 45(A). For the differing SCSL rules, compare SCSL R. P. & EvID. 44(A)
(May 28, 2010) [hereinafter SCSL RPE], with id. R. 45(C), and SCSL Directive on the As-
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is indigent, my discussion will center on the qualifications for appointment
to represent indigent defendants.
In its early years, the ICTY required defense counsel assigned to repre-

sent indigent defendants to possess only the most minimal qualifications. In
particular, a lawyer was eligible for assignment so long as the lawyer was
either a university professor of law or admitted to the practice of law and
could speak one of the tribunal's working languages. 73 Moreover, the ICTY
soon reduced even these negligible requirements by authorizing the assignment of a defense counsel who was unable to speak one of the tribunal's
working languages so long as counsel spoke the language of the accused.74
ICTY defense counsel John Ackerman pointedly described these requirements as, "perhaps, the least stringent ... that could conceivably be
imposed."75 ICTY defense counsel Michael Greaves concurred, observing
that the ICTY's qualifications standards served to provide an accused with a
virtually "uninhibited choice, regardless of experience or suitability, as to
76
who [would] represent him at trial.
In recent years, however, the ICTY has imposed additional, more bur-

densome entry requirements. It revised its language proficiency
requirement, for instance, to make it more stringent and to apply more
broadly. Initially, the tribunal's language proficiency requirement applied
only to counsel appointed for indigent accused, and such counsel could satisfy the requirement if they were able to "speak" one of the tribunal's
official languages.77 The language proficiency requirement now applies both
to counsel appointed for indigent accused as well as counsel retained by
nonindigent accused, and it requires both "written and oral proficiency" in
signment of Counsel, art. 13(B), Doc. SCSL-6-72, (Oct. 3, 2003) [hereinafter SCSL Directive]. For the differing STL rules, compare STL RPE, supra note 61, R. 58, with id. R. 59.
For the differing ECCC rules, compare ECCC INTERNAL RULES, supra note 62, R. 11(2)(c),
with id. R. 11 (4). The ICC, by contrast, requires the same qualifications of all counsel appearing before it. See KHAN & DIXON, supra note 6, § 20-89; ICC RPE, supra note 59, R. 21(2),

22(1); ICC REGULATIONS OF THE COURT, Reg. 67, ICC-BD/01-01-04 (Dec. 18, 2007) (as
amended) [hereinafter ICC COURT REGULATIONS].
73.
ICTY RPE 1994, supra note 41, R. 45.
74.
ICTY R. P. & EvID. 45(A)(ii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. II (July 25, 1997) (as amended) [hereinafter ICTY RPE 1997].
75.
John E. Ackerman, Assignment of Defense Counsel at the ICTY in ESSAYS ON
ICTY PROCEDURE,, supra note 3, at 167, 170.
76.
Michael Greaves, The Right to Counsel Before the ICTY and the ICTR for Indigent
Suspects: An Unfettered Right?, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE, supra note 3, at 177, 179.
Greaves went on to argue that the tribunal's willingness to waive the language requirement
could "fatally harm the client's interests" because counsel who did not speak French or English had little access to international criminal law rules and case law, particularly in the
ICTY's early years, when few legal materials had been translated into Bosnian, Croatian, or
Serbian. Id. at 182-83. ICTY judges and other commentators have offered similar opinions.
See, e.g., Rohde, supra note 65, at 560; Patricia M. Wald, Running the Trial of the Century:
The Nuremberg Legacy, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1559, 1572 (2006); Patricia M. Wald, Reflections on Judging:At Home and Abroad, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 219, 244 (2004).
77.
ICTY RPE 1997, supra note 74, R. 45(A)(i).
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one of the tribunal's official languages. 8 The ICTY's registrar has also introduced a more stringent vetting process to enable it to assess the language
capabilities of counsel who claim to speak English or French.79 Finally,
whereas in the past the registrar could waive the language requirement for
any defense counsel, now the registrar is permitted to waive the language
requirement only for defense counsel assigned as co-counsel.80 Consequently, lead counsel for any defendant must now have written and oral
proficiency in French or English.
In recent years, the ICTY has also required counsel assigned to represent indigent defendants to have additional substantive experience. As
noted, the ICTY initially permitted the appointment of any lawyer who was
admitted to the practice of law or who was a university professor of law.
However, in 1999, a U.N. Expert Group found these standards inadequate
and recommended that the ICTY's requirements "be brought more in line
with those of the ICTR, and in both cases elevated to require at least five

years of criminal trial experience."'" The ICTY did not initially adopt these
recommended standards, but rather amended its rules only to impose the
vaguer, less stringent requirement that appointed counsel possess "reasonable experience in criminal and/or international law." 82 It was not until 2004
that the ICTY began requiring appointed defense counsel to have both "established competence in criminal law and/or international criminal
law/international humanitarian law/international human rights law" and "at
83
least seven years of relevant experience ...in criminal proceedings.
In addition to meeting these requirements, lawyers who wish to
represent ICTY accused now must be members of the Association of
Defense Counsel, an organization established in 2002.84 The association is
authorized to expel members (which thereby prevent them from
representing ICTY defendants)85 and to require them to attend training
78.
ICTY RPE 2010, supra note 72, R.. 44(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
79.
See KHAN & DIXON, supra note 6, § 20-94; Prosecutor v. Musliu, Case No. IT-0366-PT, Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel (ICTY Oct. 21, 2003).
80.
ICTY Directive 2006, supra note 72, art. 14(C); see also Prosecutor v. Tolimir,
Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, Decision on Motion by the Accused for Review of the Registrar's
Decision of 29 June 2007, I 14-17 (ICTY July 20, 2007) (rejecting defendant's selection of
lead counsel who was not fluent in French or English).
81.
U.N. Expert Report, supra note 44, T 210.
82.
ICTY Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, art. 14(A)(iii), Directive
1/94, as amended, U.N. Doc. IT/73/Rev. 8 (Dec. 15, 2000) [hereinafter ICTY Directive 2000].
83.
ICTY RPE 2010, supra note 72, R. 45(B); accord ICTY Directive 2006, supra note
72, art. 14(A).
84.
See ICTY R. P. & EVID. 44(A), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 24 (Aug. 5, 2002) (as
amended) [hereinafter ICTY RPE 2002] (citing revision in which requirement of membership
in association of counsel was added); accord ICTY Directive 2006, supra note 72, art.
14(A)(x).
85.
Ass'n of Def. Counsel [ADC] Practising Before the ICTY, Constitution art.
6(l)(c)(ii-iii) (Oct. 23, 2004) [hereinafter ADC-ITCY Constitution], available at http://adcicty.org/Documents/adcicty-constitution.pdf.
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programs. 8 6 The association also has a Disciplinary Council that monitors
its members' representation and adjudicates complaints received against
association members for alleged misconduct.87 The ICTY itself has also
become involved in disciplining counsel. During the tribunal's early years,
it had no code of conduct for defense counsel. The ICTY adopted a code in
1997, but it contained no disciplinary mechanisms.88 The current code, by
contrast, creates a Disciplinary Panel to adjudicate ethical complaints made
against defense counsel and requires counsel to report the professional
misconduct of a colleague to the panel.89 The panel has broad investigatory
powers 90 and also has the power to temporarily suspend a lawyer from
practicing before the tribunal until the charge against her has been
adjudicated.91 Moreover, lawyers who have been found to have violated
their professional obligations may be disqualified from subsequently
representing ICTY accused.92
As this discussion shows, whereas the ICTY initially found just about
any lawyer who wished to represent an indigent defendant eligible to do so,
the tribunal has more recently introduced reasonable entry requirements.
Thus, whereas the ICTY initially did not require counsel to satisfy any
competency or experience standards, now counsel must have "established
competence" in one of the fields relevant to international criminal trials and
must have at least seven years of relevant experience in criminal proceedings.93 The ICTY has also strengthened and expanded its language
proficiency requirement and narrowed the exception it allows to that requirement.94 Finally, the ICTY has adopted a Code of Professional Conduct
that not only imposes various obligations upon counsel but is backed up
with an enforcement mechanism. 95
Although the ICTY now requires counsel wishing to represent indigent
defendants to meet reasonable entry standards, a brief look at the other

86.
Press Release, ICTY, Association of Defence Counsel Formally Recognised by the
ICTY, JA/P.I.S/720e (Dec. 19, 2002) [hereinafter ICTY ADC Press Release].
87.
88.

ADC-ITCY Constitution, supra note 85, art. 16.
See ICTY CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR DEF. COUNSEL APPEARING BEFORE THE
INT'L TRIBUNAL, U.N. Doc. IT/125 (June 12, 1997) [hereinafter FIRST ICTY CODE OF CONDUCT].

89.

ICTY

CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR DEF. COUNSEL APPEARING BEFORE THE

INT'L TRIBUNAL, art. 36, U.N. Doc. IT/125/Rev. 3 (July 22, 2009) [hereinafter CURRENT
ICTY CODE OF CONDUCT].

90.
Id. art. 44.
91.
Id. art. 45(A).
92.
See ICTY RPE 2010, supra note 72, R. 44(A)(iv); see also Prosecutor v. Krajignik,
Case No. IT-00-39-A, Decision on Krajignik Request and on Prosecution Motion,
14, 37
(ICTY Sept. 11, 2007).
93.
ICTY RPE 2010, supra note 72, R. 45(B); accord ICTY Directive 2006, supra note
72, art. 14(A).
94.
See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
95.

See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
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international tribunals shows that the ICTY lagged behind its peer institutions in imposing these requirements. 96 For instance, although the ICTR was
established virtually contemporaneously with the ICTY, it imposed more
stringent entry requirements far sooner than the ICTY and in general has
shown a far greater willingness to restrict its defendants' choice of counsel.
At the ICTR's inception, it imposed the same (minimal) requirements for
counsel wishing to represent indigent defendants as the ICTY,97 but within
three years the ICTR was requiring such counsel to have ten years relevant
experience. 98 Moreover, in 1998, the ICTR restricted defendants' choice of
counsel still further by authorizing the registrar to take account of "geographical distribution" in the assignment of defense counsel. 99 Pursuant to
this authorization, the ICTR's registrar imposed a moratorium on the assignment of French and Canadian lawyers because the registrar believed
them to be overrepresented among the ranks of ICTR defense counsel. 100
Although the moratorium gave rise to considerable protest from ICTR defendants,10 1 it remained in place for over a year until the registrar
determined that an appropriate geographical balance had been established. 102 Pointing to the moratorium and other restrictive policies, some
commentators have asserted that the ICTR sometimes "unnecessarily

96.
That said, the ICTR's defense counsel regulations have lagged behind those of the
ICTY in a few areas. For instance, the ICTR adopted its Code of Conduct in 1998, soon after
the ICTY adopted its code, but the ICTR code has not created its own disciplinary regime.
97.
See ICTR R. P. & EviD. 45(A) (June 29, 1995) (referencing language requirement
for registration on the list of counsel for indigent defendants).
98.
ICTR R. P. & EvID. 45(A) (June 8, 1998) (as amended). Of course, the requirements found in the rules and the requirements actually imposed can differ. A U.N. Office of
Internal Oversight audit suggested that the ICTR had failed to document certain background
checks and other procedures for vetting defense counsel. U.N. Office of Internal Oversight
26, 34, 37, U.N. Doc.
Servs., Internal Audit Div. II, Audit of ICTR Legal Aid Programme,
AA2005/260105 (Feb. 16, 2006) [hereinafter ICTR Legal Aid Audit]. In 2007, ICTR judges
revised the procedural rules to reduce the required experience to seven years, but they did so
because the registrar had been having difficulty finding counsel who had ten years of relevant
experience, Int'l Criminal Procedure Expert Framework [IEF], General Rules and Principles
of International Criminal Procedure, Section B(4)(A) (unpublished draft manuscript) (on file
with author) [hereinafter IEF Draft], and to enable young, highly competent ICTR staff lawyers to defend accused.
99.
Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko & Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Decision on a
Preliminary Motion by the Defence for the Assignment of a Co-counsel to Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, at 6 (Mar. 13, 1998).
100.
U.N. Expert Report, supra note 44, 230-31; Greaves, supra note 76, at 183-84;
see Caroline Buisman et al., Trial and Error: How Effective Is Legal Representationin International Criminal Proceedings?,5 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005).
101.
Simon M. Meisenberg, The Right to Legal Assistance at the InternationalCriminal
Tribunalfor Rwanda: A Review of Its Jurisprudence, in FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF AN AFRICAN JURIST, THE LATE JUDGE LAITY

KAMA

102.

125, 138 (Emmanuel Decaux et al. eds., 2007).
Greaves, supra note 76, at 185; U.N. Expert Report, supra note 44,

231.
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restricts the defendant's right to choose counsel," particularly when its policies are compared to those of the ICTY. 1°3
In addition, all of the other international tribunals have, from their outsets, required counsel to meet more rigorous entry standards than those
initially in place at the ICTY For instance, counsel who do not speak one of
the respective tribunal's working languages are not eligible to represent indigent defendants in any of the other international tribunals."° Indeed, the
ICC not only imposes the typical language proficiency requirement, but
formally enforces it by administering a language proficiency test on defense
counsel who either are not native speakers in the court's working languages
or have not extensively studied or worked in these languages.'05 In addition,
like the ICTR, the other international tribunals have required more extensive
experience and qualifications of their defense counsel. 10 6 Both the ICC and
the SCSL have not only required from their inceptions that counsel possess
competence in the subject matter of the tribunals' cases, but have also required them to be practicing lawyers. 7 In this way, the ICC and the SCSL
diverge from the ICTY, which continues to permit nonpracticing academics

103.
See, e.g., Buisman et al., supra note 100, at 15. In support of their position,
Buisman and her coauthors also point to "the policy of the ICTR registrar to refuse to assign
co-counsel as lead counsel when the latter withdraws, irrespective of the wishes of the accused." Id. at 36.
104.
See ICTR Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, art. 13, Directive No.
1/96, as amended (Mar. 14, 2008); SCSL Directive, supra note 72, art. 13; ICC RPE, supra
note 59, R. 22(1); STL RPE, supra note 61, R. 58(ii); ECCC INTERNAL RULES, supra note 62,
R. 11(4)(c)(5).

105.

KHAN

& DIXON,supra note 6, § 20-94.

106.
The SCSL requires lead counsel assigned to an indigent defendant to have seven
years of experience as counsel and to possess reasonable experience in criminal law, international law, international humanitarian law, or international human ights law. SCSL Directive,
supra note 72, art. 13. Defense counsel before the ICC similarly must demonstrate that they
have established competence in international law or domestic criminal law and procedure as
well as ten years experience "as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in
criminal proceedings." ICC RPE, supra note 59, Rule 22(1); ICC COURT REGULATIONS, supra note 72, Reg. 67(1). Even "persons who assist counsel in the presentation" of an ICC case
must have either "five years of relevant experience in criminal proceedings or specific competence in international or criminal law and procedure." ICC REGULATIONS OF THE REGISTRY,
Reg. 124, Doc. ICC-BD/03-01-06 (March 6, 2006). At the ECCC, foreign counsel must have
at least "(ten) years experience in criminal proceedings as a lawyer, judge, or prosecutor, or in
some other capacity," and "have established competence in criminal law and procedure at the
international or national level." ECCC INTERNAL RULES, supra note 62, R. 1l(4)(c)(i)-(v).
Finally, STL defense counsel must "possess established competence in criminal law and/or
international criminal law, or other relevant competence," STL RPE, supra note 61, R.
59(B)(ii), and must possess relevant experience "as a judge, prosecutor, attorney or in some
other relevant capacity" for at least ten years for lead counsel and seven years for co-counsel,
id. R. 59(B)(iii).
107.
See SCSL RPE, supra note 72, R. 44; ICC RPE, supra note 59, R. 22. Some commentators have observed that the ICC's requirements for being admitted to practice as a
defense counsel are more stringent than those which apply to ICC judges. JEF Draft, supra
note 98, at 28.
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to represent its defendants. And the STL goes so far as to require additionally that prospective defense counsel interview with an Admission Panel,
which determines whether counsel fulfills the conditions for admission.'0 8
To ascertain their competence and language skills, this panel can require
applicants to take a language proficiency test 1°9 and to complete written assignments. 110
Not only have the other international tribunals shown a greater initial
willingness than the ICTY to impose credible entry requirements on defense
counsel, they also appear to take a more active role in monitoring the performance of their defense counsel. For instance, once assigned, an ICC
defense counsel is required to "maintain a high level of competence in the
law applicable before the Court" and to "participate in training initiatives
required to maintain such competence."'11' The ICC Registry is under a corresponding obligation to develop and implement training programs for
defense counsel, 1 2 and to that end has initiated countless programs, including an annual seminar that provides comprehensive training." 3 Similarly,
the Head of the STL Defense Office has an ongoing obligation to assess
whether counsel are providing effective representation. He may "monitor
the performance and work of counsel and the persons assisting them;""' 4 he
may require counsel to undertake compulsory training;"15 and he may, in
exceptional circumstances, "invite the suspect or accused to provide his
views on the adequacy and effectiveness of his legal representation and the
performance of the assigned counsel.""' 6 Most importantly, the Head of the
STL Defense Office can back up his monitoring authority by withholding
payment of counsel's fees, seeking to remove counsel, and, where appropriate, initiating disciplinary proceedings against counsel." 7
2. Conflicts of Interest
Imposing more burdensome entry requirements on defense counsel is
not the only way in which international tribunals can restrict their defendants' choice of counsel. In addition, current ICTY defendants are less able
108.

STL RPE, supra note 72, R. 59(C).

109.
Call for Applicants List of Counsel, STL (June 1, 2011), http://www.stltsl.org/en/documents/defence-office-documents/call-for-applicants-list-of-counsel.
110.
STL Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, art. 9(E), as amended
(Nov. 10, 2010), available at http://www.stl-tsl.orglen/documents/defence-office-documents/
directive-on-the-assignment-of-defence-counsel.
111.
ICC CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR COUNSEL, art. 7(2), ICC Doc. No. ICCASP/4/Res. 1 (Jan. 1, 2006).
112.
ICC REGULATIONS OF THE REGISTRY, supra note 106, Regs. 140, 141.
113.

KHAN & DIXON, supra note 6, § 20-42.

114.

STL RPE, supra note 61, R. 57(G)(i).

115.

Id. R. 58(C).

116.
117.

Id. R. 57(G)(iv).
Id. R. 57(H).
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than their predecessors to be represented by the counsel of their choice be-

cause changes to the ICTY's conflict of interest rules make it more likely
that counsel will be found to suffer from a disqualifying conflict of interest.118 Some revisions concern the lawyer's general orientation toward her
client and the tribunal," 9 but the amendments that are most relevant to this

study concern the defendant's ability to consent to conflicts. For instance,
whereas the ICTY's original Code of Conductfor Defense Counsel permitted a client to consent to representation when his lawyer represented

matanother client with materially adverse interests in a similar or identical
2
ter,120 the current code does not permit consent in such a situation.'1

An even more significant change pertains to the defendant's ability to
consent to any conflict. The ICTY's initial code provided that, when a conflict arose, counsel either had to "take all steps necessary to remove the
conflict" or had to "obtain the full and informed consent of all potentially
affected Clients to continue the representation, so long as Counsel [wa]s
able to fulfil all other obligations under th[e] Code."' 122 Pursuant to this rule,

then, clients were permitted to consent to serious conflicts, as evidenced by
the Trial Chamber's treatment of the conflicts that arose in the Simi6 case in
1999.123

There, Simo Zari's lawyer, Borislav Pisarevid, had personal

knowledge of some of the events that were to be adjudicated at trial. In particular, Pisarevi6 was alleged to have concealed a prospective witness in his

118.
Initially, the ICTY manifested an extremely tolerant attitude toward conflicts of
interest. In the Celebii case, for instance, the lead counsel for Esad Landzo at trial became
lead counsel for Landzo's codefendant Zejnil Delalid for the appeal. Landzo sought counsel's
removal on conflict of interest grounds, alleging that counsel was privy to confidential information that could be detrimental to Landzo's appeal. The Appeals Chamber rejected Landzo's
motion, finding without elaboration that "the material before it does not disclose the existence
of a conflict of interest or any other ground for holding that John Ackerman is in contravention of the [relevant] standards of conduct." Prosecutor v. Delali6, Mucic, Delic & Landzo,
Case No. IT-96-21, Order Regarding Esad Landzo's Request for Removal of John Ackerman
as Counsel on Appeal for Zejnil Delalid (ICTY May 6, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
mucic/tord/en/90506DS37 199.htm.
119.
The ICTY's original rule required counsel to "at all times act in the best interests of
the Client and [to] put those interests before their own interests or those of any other person."
FIRST ICTY CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 88, art. 9(1). The corresponding rule in the current code reaffirms counsel's duty of loyalty to his client but provides that "Counsel also has a
duty to the Tribunal to act with independence in the interests of justice and shall put those
interests before his own interests or those of any other person, organisation or State." CURRENT ICTY CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 89, art. 14(A).
120.
FIRST ICTY CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 88, art. 9(3)(c)(iii).

121.
CURRENT ICTY CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 89, art. 14(D)(iii). The current
code also limits the ability of former ICTY staff members to represent accused. See id. art.
14(C) (stating that counsel cannot represent a defendant in a case in which counsel participated "as an official or staff member of the Tribunal in any capacity" regardless of consent).
122.
FIRST ICTY CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 88, art. 9(5)(b).
123.
See Prosecutor v. Simi6 et al.,
Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on the Prosecution
Motion to Resolve Conflict of Interest Regarding Attorney Borislav Pisarevi6 (ICTY Mar. 25,
1999).
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home on the night of an important Serb attack, and he had seen other witnesses in the custody of his client's codefendant. 24 As a result of his
involvement in these events, Pisarevi6 was subject to being called as a witness to corroborate or undermine the testimony of these witnesses. In
addition, Pisarevid had previously represented certain prosecution witnesses
and, in representing Zari6, he was likely to be called upon to cross-examine
his former clients. 25 Thus, the case presented a potential conflict with a past
client and a strong likelihood that the lawyer would be called as a prosecution witness in his client's own case, but the Simi6 Trial Chamber
nonetheless determined that obtaining Zarid's full and informed consent
was "an appropriate mechanism" for dealing with the conflict at that

stage. 126
By contrast, the current ICTY code limits a defendant's ability to consent to a conflict because it permits consent only where it is not "likely to
irreversibly prejudice the administration of justice."'' 27 This vague restriction
gives ICTY judges considerable discretion to hold that a conflict cannot be
cured by a defendant's consent. Indeed, pursuant to this provision, the ICTY
has refused to permit consent in a series of cases presenting conflicts. In
Prli6, for instance, defense counsel Zeljko Olujid was barred from representing defendant Bruno Stojid because Olujid was simultaneously
representing another ICTY accused, Ivica Raji6. 2 8 Both Stojid and Rajid
consented to Olujid's continued representation, but because Stojid and Rajid
were "charged with the same criminal acts, and were allegedly linked by a
relatively close superior-subordinate relationship," the Appeals Chamber
concluded that there was "a substantial conflict of interests."' 129 Similarly,
the Appeals Chamber found that an unwaivable conflict of interest existed
when Jovan Simid sought to represent both Jeljko Mejakid and Dragoljub
Prcad, because Mejakid was a direct superior of Prcad and Prcad had already
given the prosecution incriminating evidence against Mejakid.13 o
124.
125.

Id. pt. II(A)(l)-(2).
See id.

126.
Id. pt. II(B)(IJI).
127.
CURRENT ICTY CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 89, art. 14(E)(ii)(2).
128.
Prosecutor v. Prlid et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR73. l, Decision on Appeal by Bruno
Stojic Against Trial Chamber's Decision on Request for Appointment of Counsel, IT 28-33
(ICTY Nov. 24, 2004).
129.
Id. $$ 24, 27.
130.
Prosecutor v. Mejaki6 et al., Case No. IT-02-65-AR73.1, Decision on Appeal by the
Prosecution to Resolve Conflict of Interest Regarding Attorney Jovan Simi6, 13 (ICTY Oct.
6, 2004). Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-AR73.2, Decision on
Ivan Cermak's Interlocutory Appeal Against Trial Chamber's Decision on Conflict of Interest
of Attorneys Credo Prodanovi6 and Jadranka Slokovic (ICTY June 29, 2007), Cedo Prodanovi6 and Jadranka Slokovi6 were barred from representing defendant Ivan Cermak due to a
conflict that arose from their simultaneous representation of Rahim Ademi, who was awaiting
trial in Croatia. Although (Cermak and Ademi were at that time charged with crimes taking
place several years apart, the Appeals Chamber could not rule out the possibility that Ademi
would later be charged with the same crimes for which (Cermak was accused, particularly if
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Concededly, the conflicts at issue in these cases were serious, but under
previous rules they would not have prevented defendants from retaining the
counsel of their choice. Indeed, the registar's treatment of legal associate

Marko Sladojevi6 shows the careful scrutiny to which conflicts of interest
are now subject. The registrar refused to appoint Sladojevi6 as a legal associate on the Karadi defense team due to a perceived conflict of interest

stemming from Sladojevi's representation of Momcilo Krajignik.' 3' The
registrar refused the appointment despite the fact that both Karadli6 and
Krajignik had consented to the representation, despite the fact that the Krajignik Appeals Judgement had already been issued, and despite the fact that
the registrar had previously appointed Sladojevi6 in the Popovi6 case while
he was acting as a legal associate to Krajignik. 32 The Karadi6 Trial
Chamber eventually reversed the registrar's decision,' 33 but the decision

itself underscores the increasing willingness of ICTY officials to rigorously
apply the tribunal's conflict of interest provisions to limit defendants'
choice of counsel.
Comparing the ICTY's conflict of interest rules with the analogous
rules of the other tribunals is not especially illuminating. The ECCC and the
STL do not have conflict of interest rules at present, 3 4 and there is virtually
no conflict of interest jurisprudence at the tribunals that do have rules be-

cause defendants at the other international tribunals do not frequently seek
representation by defense counsel from their own countries; 13 thus, the conflicts that often arise concerning Yugoslavian defense counsel at the ICTY

simply have not come up at the other tribunals. Finally, what rules do exist
suggest that the other tribunals have adopted conflict of interest provisions
(termak's defense sought to shift the blame from Cermak to Ademi. Id. 26. Furthermore,
Ademi was alleged to have exercised command authority over termak, and although it might
have benefited 1 ermak to implicate Ademi in the crimes for which termak was charged,
counsel would not have been able to pursue that strategy because to do so would violate the
counsel's duty of loyalty to Ademi. Id. [ 27. Finally, in an earlier decision by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in this case, defense counsel Miroslav eparovi6 argued that the Trial Chamber
should have followed Simi and held that his client's consent cured the conflict. Prosecutor v.
Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-AR73.1, Decision on Miroslav eparovi6's Interlocutory
Appeal Against Trial Chamber's Decision on Conflict of Interest and Finding of Misconduct,
32 (May 4, 2007). However, the Appeals Chamber found the Simi6 holding to be inapplicable because Simi6 had been decided before the ICTY limited the defendant's ability to consent
to a conflict. Id. In the Appeals Chamber's view, no consent was possible because eparovid's
continued representation was "likely to irreversibly prejudice the administration of justice." Id.
$33.
131.
Prosecutor v. Karadli6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Accused Request for
Judicial Review of the Registry Decision on the Assignment of Mr. Marko Sladojevi6 as Legal
Associate,
16-18 (ICTY Apr. 20, 2009).
132.
133.
134.

Id.
16-17.
Id.
18-19.
The STL is still drafting its Code of Conduct. For the ECCC, I could find no rules.

135.
However, some SCSL defendants, in the CDF and AFRC cases, have been represented by Sierra Leonean counsel, including Arrow Bockarie, Ansu Lansana, and Charles
Margai.
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similar to those of the ICTY. The SCSL's consent provision mirrors the current ICTY provision, and consequently permits a defendant to consent only
' 136
to conflicts that are "unlikely to prejudice the administration of justice."
The ICC has not limited the defendant's ability to consent in that way, but it
has prohibited counsel from acting in a case where there is a substantial
likelihood that the counsel or an associate of the counsel will be required to
appear as a witness. 137 This provision, therefore, would have prevented
Pisarevi6 from continuing to represent Simi6 had that case been before the
ICC.
B. Firing Counsel

Just as the ICTY initially afforded defendants wide discretion in selecting their first lawyer, it similarly afforded them free rein to fire the lawyer
they had selected and to choose another one. For instance, the registrar permitted Vlatko Kupregkid's lawyers to withdraw merely upon the lawyers'
representation that the defendant had cancelled their power of attorney because he no longer trusted them. 13 8 Similarly, the Celebiei Trial Chamber
granted Zdravko Muci6's request for the assignment of new counsel even
though the reasons Muci6 invoked for seeking his current counsel's withdrawal "[did] not reflect upon the competence or qualifications of' that
counsel. 13 9 That is, ICTY defendants needed to make no showing of inadequate or wrongful behavior on the part of their current lawyers in order to
get those lawyers replaced. It was enough, according to the Trial Chamber,
that "the reasons for the accused's dissatisfaction with the counsel ...are

genuine and that the request is not being made for frivolous reasons or in a
desire to pervert the course of justice, e.g., by causing additional delay." 140
These lax standards show that the ICTY gave "wide effect to the concept of
'counsel of choice,'" which, not surprisingly, led in some cases to "a bewildering series of changes of counsel representing an individual
Defendant."14 '
Just as the ICTY has in recent years applied more stringent entry requirements and conflicts of interest rules on defense counsel, it likewise has
lately applied a more stringent standard to requests for counsel changes. For
136.

SCSL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR COUNSEL WITH THE RIGHT OF AUDIENCE

15(D)(2) (May 13, 2006) (as amended),
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=IbTonPmXLHk%3D&tabid=176.
BEFORE THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, art.

137.
ICC CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR COUNSEL, supra note I 1l,art. 12(C). Two
exceptions to this prohibition exist: where the counsel's testimony relates to an uncontested
issue or to the value of counsel's services. Id.
138.
Prosecutor v. Kupregki6, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Decision (ICTY May 17, 2000).
139.
Prosecutor v. Delali6, Mucic, Delic & Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on
Request by Accused Muci6 for Assignment of New Counsel, at 1 (ICTY June 24, 1996).
140.
Id. 3.
141.
Greaves, supra note 76, at 185. Similarly, a 1999 U.N. Expert Group criticized the
ICTY and ICTR for allowing "an excessive number of changes in assigned counsel." U.N.
Expert Report, supra note 44, 1 218.
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instance, by 2003, a U.N. report observed that a defendant was allowed to
change his defense counsel only upon a showing of "unusual and compelling circumstances."1 42 In particular, the report described the ICTY registrar
as permitting an "accused to choose new counsel only where there is evidence of exceptional circumstances, such as a complete breakdown in the
relationship between counsel and client, or if counsel is ordered to withdraw
from a case for ethical reasons.' 1 4 3 Some cases, however, suggest that even a
"complete breakdown in the relationship between counsel and client" may
not be sufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying a counsel
change. Vidoje Blagojevid, for instance, sought the removal of his cocounsel but he did not succeed because his lead counsel wished to retain the
co-counsel, and the Trial Chamber held that the decision to appoint or remove co-counsel was in the hands of lead counsel." Blagojevi6 responded
by seeking to remove his lead counsel. By this time, Blagojevi6 was no
longer willing to have any contact with his lead counsel, but despite the unquestionable breakdown in communication, the Registry, Trial Chamber,
45
and Appeals Chamber all refused Blagojevi6's request to replace counsel. 1
The Trial Chamber blamed Blagojevi6 for the breakdown in communication, and held that an accused's decision "to cease communications with
counsel is not equivalent to counsel breaching their obligation to communicate and consult with their client."' 46 As for Blagojevi6's lack of trust in his
counsel, the Trial Chamber held that
[a] lack of trust in counsel based on disagreements in approach to
one's defence, including the criteria upon which to determine the
appropriate candidate for co-counsel, is distinguishable from a lack
of trust due to a breach by counsel in fulfilling his professional and
ethical responsibilities in the course of representation.' 47
Thus, although in the past, the ICTY would authorize a counsel change if
the defendant could show a genuine breakdown in communication and a
lack of trust regardless of the cause, now those conditions are sufficient to
justify a change of counsel only when they stem from counsel's failure to
fulfill his or her professional responsibilities.
The standards for discharging counsel are less clear at some of the more
recently established international tribunals, 4 but the rules and case law of
142.

Comprehensive Report, supra note 6,

143.

Id. 151.

49.

Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on Independent
144.
Counsel for Vidoje Blagojevid's Motion to Instruct the Registrar to Appoint New Lead and
78-85 (ICTY July 3, 2003).
Co-Counsel,
Id.
145.
Id. 120.
146.
Id.
147.
The ICC appears to have no standards governing a defendant's request to discharge
148.
counsel, and the issue has not come up in the cases. Because the STL currently has no defendants, it also has not addressed the issue in a case, and Article 34 of the STL's Directive on
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the ICTR and SCSL establish standards that appear to mirror those currently in place at the ICTY. Like the ICTY, the ICTR's treatment of this issue

has evolved over time. As early as 1997, the ICTR amended its procedural
rules to add Rule 45(H), which allows Trial Chambers to instruct the regis-

trar to replace an assigned counsel only "in exceptional circumstances ...
upon good cause being shown" and only if satisfied that the request for re-

placement "is not designed to delay the proceedings." 14 9 Even after the

adoption of Rule 45(H), however, it was not uncommon for defendants to
change counsel several times during the course of their proceedings., 50 In
more recent times, though, ICTR Trial Chambers have interpreted the "exceptional circumstances" requirement far more rigorously. Whereas early
ICTR defendants could meet the requirement simply by asserting that there
had been a breakdown in communication and trust between themselves and
counsel, 5' by 2006, most decisions holding that a breakdown of trust constituted exceptional circumstances found that the breakdown of trust was
attributable to some documented failing on the part of defense counsel, such
as "lack of knowledge of the Rwandan context and history; a lack of initiative in the defence of the accused; an exceptional workload incompatible
with other professional commitments; a breach of professional responsibilities, including the obligation to communicate with the client; and
misconduct or manifest negligence."' 52 Similarly, during a 2006 U.N. audit
of the ICTR's Legal Aid Programme, the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight
the Assignment of Defense Counsel, which permits the Head of the Defence Office to withdraw the assignment of counsel upon the request of the accused, provides the office no
standards to guide its determination of the matter. See STL Directive, supra note 110, art. 34.
The ECCC's rule, like the ICTY's, permits defendants to change counsel only "in exceptional
circumstances." ECCC Defence Support Section Administrative Regulations, art. 7.2, ECCC
Doc. No. RS-9.7.07. The ECCC Defence Support Section looked to the jurisprudence of the
other international tribunals in deciding the one request it has received for a counsel change,
but found the request easy to grant because it came after the trial was completed so that the
counsel change necessitated no disruption to the proceedings. Trial Proceedings of Kaing
Guek Eav (Duch), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC, Request by Mr. Kaing to Withdraw Co4, 6 (July 5, 2010).
Lawyer Francois Roux,
ICTR RPE 2009, supra note 72, R. 45(H).
149.
232-33 (citing Prosecutor v.
See, e.g., U.N. Expert Report, supra note 44,
150.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Decision Relating to the Assignment of Counsel, at 3 (July
27, 1999), in which defendant changed counsel six times during the course of proceedings);
Prosecutor v. Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-97-27-I, Decision on the Accused's Request for Withdrawal of His Counsel, Deliberations (Mar. 29, 2001) ("He is now requesting a fifth change.").
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Decision on the Request of the
151.
Accused for the Replacement of Assigned Counsel (Nov. 20, 1996); Prosecutor v. Bagosora,
Case No. ICTR-96-7-T, Decision on the Request of the Accused for Change of Assigned
Counsel (June 26, 1997); Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhko & Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-2 1-T,
Decision on Ntahobali's Motion on Withdrawal of Counsel, 14 (June 22, 2001).
152.
Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza's Motion Contesting the Decision of the President
Refusing to Review and Reverse the Decision of the Registrar Relating to the Withdrawal of
Co-Counsel, 12 (Nov. 23, 2006).
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Services reviewed five cases and found "that counsel was withdrawn or
changed only on exceptional grounds."' 53

The SCSL applies the same Rule 45(H) to requests for changes of
counsel, and its application of the rule in the RUF case showed the Trial
Chamber's considerable reluctance to permit counsel changes.' 54 There, Augustine Gbao sought repeatedly to discharge his lead counsel, his first
requests dating from the very outset of his trial. 55 Eventually, the lawyer
came to agree with Gbao that they should part ways and consequently
sought permission to withdraw on the ground that Gbao had refused to pro-

vide him instructions and had made public statements that caused the
lawyer "a great degree of personal and professional embarrassment."' t 56 The

Trial Chamber rejected both Gbao's and his counsel's requests, finding that
no exceptional circumstances had been demonstrated and that the Trial

Chamber had "full confidence in the Defence Counsel and his ability to
properly act in the best interest" of the defendant.157 The Trial Chamber did

eventually relent and permit Gbao to discharge his counsel, but only three
and one-half years after Gbao's first request. By that time, the counsel had
taken two cases at the ICTR,' 58 the Trial Chamber had been "flooded with

letters" from Gbao seeking his lawyer's withdrawal, and even Gbao's cocounsel agreed that "there existfed] an 'irrevocable breakdown in
confidence' between the Accused and his lead counsel ...

uation was 'irredeemable.'

and that the sit-

"159

C. Self-Representation

Whereas the foregoing Sections have detailed the evolution in the
ICTY's jurisprudence regarding the hiring and firing of defense counsel,
this Section turns to the evolution in the ICTY's treatment of defendants
153.
ICTR Legal Aid Audit, supra note 98, 35.
154.
Notably, however, the SCSL failed entirely to apply the standard when defendant
Charles Taylor dramatically fired his counsel on the first day of trial and counsel left the courtroom despite repeated orders from the Trial Chamber to remain. Sara Kendall, The Opening of
the Trial of Charles Taylor: Early Developments and Delays, SIERRA LEONE TRIAL MONITORING PROJECT WKLY. REP.

(U.C. Berkeley War Crimes Studies Ctr., Berkeley, Calif.) July 3,

2007, at 2-3, 9.
155.
See Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Gbao-Decision on Application to Withdraw Counsel, I 1, 5, 7 (July 6, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sesay,
Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-AR73, Gbao-Decision on Appeal Against Decision
on Withdrawal of Counsel,
29-61 (Nov. 23, 2004); Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Written Reasons for Decision on Application of Third Accused to Dispense with the Mandate of
Court Appointed Counsel, Mr. Andreas O'Shea, 6 (Dec. 6, 2007).
156.
Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Application by Counsel for the Third
Accused to Withdraw from the Case, 2 (Apr. 5, 2006).
157.
Id.
158.
Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Written Reasons for Decision on Application of
Third Accused to Dispense with the Mandate of Court Appointed Counsel, Mr. Andreas
O'Shea, %12 (Dec. 6, 2007).
159.
Id. [[29, 31.
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who wish to forego counsel entirely. Echoing Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, the statutes of all of the
international tribunals provide an accused with the right to "defend himself
in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing," 160 and the tribunals have interpreted this language as providing defendants with a right of
self-representation. Again, among the international tribunals, the ICTY has
the most developed practice, and that tribunal has considered the right of
self-representation in the Miloevi6, Segelj, Tolimir, and Karadi6 cases.

However, most of those cases featured both notorious defendants and starkly different factual circumstances, so it is difficult to trace a clear evolution
in the ICTY's treatment of this issue over time. Nevertheless, the following
discussion suggests that whereas the tribunal initially showed great willingness to tolerate delay and to otherwise adapt its proceedings as a
consequence of an accused's decision to represent himself, that willingness
had substantially declined by the time Radovan Karadid's case came to
trial. Indeed, as early as 2006, Nina Jorgensen observed that the focus of the
ICTY's self-representation jurisprudence had "shifted from establishing the
modalities for the exercise of the right ... to establishing the circumstances
under
which the right may be qualified and the modalities of restricting
it.' 161 In particular, as I will explain below, whereas the ICTY went to great
lengths to preserve Milogevi's and Segelj's right of self-representation,
even though doing so disrupted, delayed, and impaired the dignity of those
trials, the ICTY has shown no similar solicitude for Tolimir's or Karadi's
desire to self-represent.
A brief look at the Miloevi6 and Seelj proceedings demonstrates the
lengths to which the ICTY has been willing to go in order to accommodate
a defendant's right of self-representation. Milogevi's self-representation
proved problematic from the very outset of his proceedings because he
initially refused to answer questions and made lengthy, irrelevant speeches
instead of legal arguments. 162 Milogevi6's behavior improved as the
proceedings progressed, but he continued to browbeat witnesses and make
disparaging comments about the court, 163 tactics that, not surprisingly,
lengthened the conduct of his trial. In addition, Milogevi6 suffered from
160.
ICTY Statute, supra note 66, art. 21(4)(d); ICTR Statute, supra note 66, art.
20(4)(d); SCSL Statute, supra note 66, art. 17(4)(d); STL Statute, supra note 60, art. 16(4)(d);
Rome Statute, supra note 57, art. 67(1)(d); ECCC Statute, supra note 66, art. 35(d).
161.
Nina H.B. Jorgensen, The Problem of Self-Representation at InternationalCriminal
Tribunals,4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 64, 65 (2006).
162.
See Prosecutor v. Milogevik, Case No. IT-99-37-I, Transcript of Initial Appearance,
at 2-5 (ICTY July 3, 2001); id., Transcript, at 66-68 (Oct. 29, 2001); id., Transcript, at 13440 (Dec. 11, 2001); id., Transcript, at 286-89 (Jan. 9, 2002); see also PATRICIA M. WALD,
OPEN Soc'Y INST., TYRANTS ON TRIAL: KEEPING ORDER IN THE COURTROOM 31 (2009),
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international-justice/articles-publications/public
ations/tyrants_2009091 1/tyrants_2009091 l.pdf; Michael P. Scharf & Christopher M. Rassi,
Do Former Leaders Have an InternationalRight to Self-Representation in War Crimes Trials?, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RES. 3, 4 (2005).
163.
Scharf & Rassi, supra note 162, at 5.
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severe, chronic cardiovascular problems, and the consequent bouts of
exhaustion likewise led to numerous delays, as Milogevi6 was often unable
to attend trial."6 To prevent these delays, the prosecution repeatedly asked
the Trial Chamber to impose counsel on Milogevi6, 165 but the Trial Chamber
instead reduced the trial schedule so as to give Milogevi6 more time to
rest. 166 Despite the reduced schedule, MilogeviCs health-related absences

continued. A little more than two years into the trial, more than sixty trial
days (which was the equivalent of approximately six months of trial time on
the reduced schedule) had been lost. The prosecution's case had been

interrupted more than a dozen times,167and the commencement of the defense
case had been postponed five times.

The Trial Chamber did eventually appoint defense counsel for Milogevi. The Appeals Chamber reluctantly upheld the appointment, but it
reversed the Trial Chamber's Order on Modalities. In particular, the Appeals

Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had "failed to recognize that any
restrictions on Milogevi6's right to represent himself must be limited to the
minimum extent necessary to protect the Tribunal's interest in assuring a
reasonably expeditious trial."' 68 Concluding that the Trial Chamber had

"relegate[d] Milogevi6 to a visibly second-tier role in the trial,"' 69 the Appeals Chamber ordered the Trial Chamber to craft a working regime rooted
in the default presumption that, "when he is physically capable of doing so,
Milogevi6 will take the lead in presenting his case" by questioning witnesses, arguing motions, and presenting a closing statement. 170 Thus, Milogevi6
did continue to present his case. He also continued to flout various

Even during the early phases of his trial, Milogevi 's poor health frequently pre164.
vented him from attending. In 2002, for instance, he was absent March 18-28, June 17-27,
July 18-19, November 1-6, and November 12-15. Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-0254-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, 6 n.10 (ICTY Sept. 22,
2004).
Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Prosecution's Submission on the Implications of
165.
the Accused's Recurring Ill-Health and the Future Conduct of the Case--Corrected Version
(ICTY Sept. 30, 2003); Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, 7 (ICTY Apr. 4, 2003).
166.
Milogevik, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion
Concerning Assignment of Counsel, T 41. Evenually, the Trial Chamber decided to sit for only
three days per week, thereby providing Milogevi6 with four consecutive rest days per week.
Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Transcript, at 27063 (ICTY Sept. 30, 2003).
Miloevik, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion
167.
Concerning Assignment of Counsel, I 11; see also WALD, supra note 162, at 38 ("During
most of the next four years, his ill health required constant recesses; 66 trial days ... had to be
canceled for health reasons .... ").
Prosecutor v. Milolevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
168.
Appeal of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, 17 (ICTY
Nov. 1, 2004).
Id. 16.
169.
Id. 19.
170.
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procedural rules, 171 and he continued to delay the trial with his political

grandstanding. 72 Finally, and most importantly, Milogevi6's medical conditions continued to delay the trial. The Trial Chamber continued to sit for
only three days per week to enable Milogevi6 to rest, 173 and it continued to
adjourn the trial when even that schedule proved too demanding.' 74 Finally,
the Trial Chamber rejected the prosecution's request that appointed counsel be permitted to present the case during Milogevir's health-related

absences.175
According to some commentators, ICTY judges "ben[t] over backwards
to maintain the appearance of fairness" and thereby "permitted Milogevi6 to
treat witnesses, prosecutors, and themselves in a manner that would earn
ordinary defense counsel expulsion from the courtroom."' 176 But even if they

did, the ICTY's tolerance of Milogevi's trial tactics pales in comparison to
the accommodation it has made for Vojislav Segelj. From his first day in The
Hague, Segelj made absolutely clear that he would not comply with the tribunal's rules and that he instead intended to use the trial as a political
platform. 177 In response, and over Segelj's vehement opposition, the Trial
Chamber appointed standby counsel for Segelj less than three months after
he arrived in The Hague. 78 Segelj remained fully in charge of his case even
after the appointment of standby counsel because counsel was charged
merely with assisting Segelj "whenever [Segelj] so requested."'179 But by
installing standby counsel, the Trial Chamber ensured that if Segelj engaged
"in disruptive conduct or conduct requiring his removal from the courtroom," then standby counsel could take over the defense. 80
171.
Milolevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Transcript, at 34520-33, 34555-63 (ICTY Dec.
15, 2004); see also Judith Armatta, A Role for Assigned Counsel, GLOBAL POL'Y F (Dec. 15,
2004), http://www.globalpolicy.org/componentlcontentlarticle/163/29330.html; Alison Freebairn, Miloyevi5 Running Out of Time, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Nov. 17, 2005),
http://iwpr.net/report-news/nilosevic-running-out-time.
172.

See Mirjan Damalka, Assignment of Counsel and Perceptions of Fairness, 3 J.

INT'L CRIM. JUST.

3, 4 (2005); Freebairn, supra note 171.

173.
Freebairn, supra note 171.
174.
See Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Transcript, at 46667-69 (ICTY Nov. 29,
2005); Anthony Deutsch, Slobodan Milogeviks Trial Adjourned After Defendant Says He Is

Unwell,

ASSOCIATED PRESS,

Nov. 16, 2005; MilogeviW Trial Adjourned Until 23 January,

Dec. 12, 2005, http://www.sense-agency.com/icty/milosevic-trialadjoumed-until-23-january.29.htmlcat id= 1&newsid=9422.
SENSE

TRIBUNAL,

175.
Miloevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Specific
Orders Relating to Trial in Absentia (ICTY Jan. 20, 2006).
176.
Scharf & Rassi, supra note 162, at 4-5.
177.
Prosecutor v. egelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for
Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav egelj with His Defence, [23-26 (ICTY May 9,
2003).
178.
Id. 127.
179.
Id. 130.
180.
Id.
28, 30. As noted, egelj vehemently opposed the appointment of standby
counsel and thereafter worked tirelessly to revoke it. egelj's efforts are described in 9erelj,
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Segelj continued his remarkably disruptive and obstructionist conduct
during his lengthy pretrial proceedings. According to the Trial Chamber,
Segelj repeatedly raised "irrelevant or specious matters," '' he repeatedly
used obscene or offensive language, 182 he breached confidentiality, 8 3 and he
showed an "unwillingness to follow rules set by the Tribunal" in "almost all
of his submissions."'18 4 In summary, the Trial Chamber concluded that most
of Segelj's 191 submissions had been "frivolous and abusive," and they
showed Segelj to be "a person bent on following a path of persistent obstruction of the judicial process."'85 In consequence of these conclusions,
the Trial Chamber imposed counsel on Segelj.186 Segelj appealed, and although the Appeals Chamber disputed none of the Trial Chamber's factual
findings, it reversed the Trial Chamber's imposition of defense counsel,
holding that the Trial Chamber should have specifically warned Segelj that
counsel would be imposed if his disruptive behavior continued. 1' In so
holding, the Appeals Chamber itself explicitly warned Segelj that "should
his self-representation ... substantially obstruct the proper and expeditious
proceedings in his case, the Trial Chamber will be justified in promptly assigning him counsel" after giving him a chance to be heard. 88
When the case then returned to the Trial Chamber after appeal, Segelj
had no counsel, standby or other. This is because the Registry had withdrawn the standby counsel who had been serving up until that time when it
had appointed counsel for Se~elj on the Trial Chamber's order, 8 9 and the
Appeals Chamber had reversed the Trial Chamber's appointment of counsel.
Seeking to reintroduce the status quo ante, the Trial Chamber ordered the
registrar to reappoint standby counsel under basically the same conditions
as had previously governed the standby counsel's relationship with Segelj. 90
Segelj, however, vigorously opposed the reappointment of standby counsel
Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Request of the Accused to Revoke the Ruling of the Trial
Chamber to Appoint Standby Counsel (ICTY May 3, 2005), and Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67PT, Decision on Submission No. 115 (ICTY June 16, 2006). See also Alexander Zahar, Legal
Aid, Self-Representation, and the Crisis at the Hague Tribunal, 19 CRIM. L.F 241, 242
(2008).
181.
Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment of Counsel, 34 (ICTY
Aug. 21, 2006).
182.
Id. IT 45, 46, 48-52, 55-56, 58.
183.
Id. 54, 63.
184.
Id. 41.
185.
Id. 175.
186.
Id. T 81.
187.
Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.3, Decision on Appeal Against the
Trial Chamber's Decision on Assignment of Counsel,
22-26, 52 (ICTY Oct. 20, 2006).
188.
Id. 152.
189.
Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Order Concerning Appointment of Standby Counsel
and Delayed Commencement of Trial, 4 (ICTY Oct. 25, 2006).
190.
Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the
Trial Chamber's Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel, 6 (ICTY Dec. 8, 2006).
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and in response launched a hunger strike. For the next twenty-eight days,
Segelj refused all food and medicine and also refused to participate in his
trial.'9 1 The Trial Chamber repeatedly warned Segelj that it would impose
counsel unless he began participating in the192trial, and on November 27,
2006, the Trial Chamber did impose counsel.

Segelj again appealed and by the time the case was before the Appeals
Chamber, Segelj was in a "severely weakened" condition 193 and likely to die
within two weeks. 194 No doubt concerned about Se~elj's grave condition and
the negative publicity his death would have generated, the Appeals Chamber

essentially capitulated to Segelj's demands by prohibiting the Trial Chamber
from imposing standby counsel "unless Segelj exhibits obstructionist behavior fully satisfying the Trial Chamber that, in order to ensure a fair and
expeditious trial, Segelj requires the assistance of standby counsel."' 95 Describing the decision as one "in which any coherent legal argument is hard
to detect," Gdran Sluiter opined that it served "no other purpose than to put

an end to Segelj's hunger strike."' 96 Moreover, after the Appeals Chamber's
decision, Segelj's case was transferred to a Trial Chamber that has been remarkably accommodating of his desire to self-represent. For instance,
although Segelj's case was ready for trial in November 2006 when the Appeals Chamber first reinstated his right to represent himself, his trial did not

191.

Serbian PoliticianEnds His Hunger Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2006, at A5.
192.
See Prosecutor v. egelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Request for Certification to Appeal Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel, I 1 (ICTY Dec. 5, 2006); .elelj,
Case No. IT-03-67-T, Pre-Trial Conference Transcript, at 818, 823-25 (ICTY Nov. 27, 2006).
193.
Serbian Politician Ends His Hunger Strike, supra note 191.
194.
Serb Suspect 'Can Be Force Fed,' BBC NEWS, Dec. 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/europe/6214862.stm.
195.
eelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber's Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel, 28. The Appeals Chamber conceded that
its decision restoring Segelj's right to self-representation did not expressly prohibit the Trial
Chamber from reappointing standby counsel, but it held that by doing so immediately after the
Appeals Chamber's decision and without any showing of additional obstruction by egelj, the
Trial Chamber undermined "the practical implementation" of the Appeals Chamber's decision. Id. 26.
196.
Goran Sluiter, Karadi on Trial: Two ProceduralProblems, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
617, 620 (2008). Sluiter critiqued the decision in greater detail in Goran Sluiter, Compromising the Authority of International Criminal Justice, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 529, 533-34
(2007). Alexander Zahar agreed, observing that the Appeals Chamber "capitulated to egelj's
blackmail, twisting process and law" so as to provide egelj "not only with selfrepresentation, but with self-representation untrammeled by standby counsel." Zahar, supra
note 180, at 244; see also Eugene Cerruti, Self-Representation in the InternationalArena:
Removing a False Right of Spectacle, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 919, 982 (2009). At the same time,
it must be acknowledged that certain extralegal factors understandably may have influenced
the Appeals Chamber's decision. In particular, egelj's Radical Party was seeking power in
upcoming Serbian elections, and tribunal officials as well as the Serbian government feared
that egelj's death would render him a martyr in the popular imagination and would thereby
boost hard-line nationalists. See Marlise Simons, UN Tribunal Halts Trial of Serb Sent to
Hospital,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at A3.
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another year, largely as a consequence of Segelj's pretrial debegin for
197
mands.
By the time Zdravko Tolimir and Radovan KaradMi6 asserted their right
to self-represent in 2007 and 2008, respectively, the tribunal was ready to

take firmer control of the issues surrounding self-representation. Such firm
control initially appeared necessary because Tolimir appeared ready to use
some of the same obstructionist tactics that had characterized Milogevi6's

and Segelj's trial strategies. To be sure, Tolimir did not insult the tribunal or
otherwise behave belligerently, but he did obstruct his pretrial proceedings

by steadfastly refusing to accept any documents from the prosecution or

Registry because the documents were not provided in the Cyrillic script.'98
Although Tolimir claimed not to be able to read Serbian in Latin script, 199
the Pre-Trial Judge and the Appeals Chamber each rejected his request to be
provided documents in the Cyrillic script, finding that he could read the

documents provided to him.

0

Further, when Tolimir continued to refuse

receipt of documents, the Trial Chamber formally warned him that failure to
accept the documents would result in the immediate imposition of

counsel.2"' Tolimir thereafter agreed to receive documents (through his legal
adviser),20 2 and his trial is proceeding apace.

The Trial Chamber seemed even more inclined to cabin the notorious
Radovan Karad!iW's ability to disrupt his trial through his selfrepresentation. Just a few months after Karadii6 began to self-represent, the
tribunal amended its procedural rules to specifically authorize a Trial
Chamber to assign counsel to represent the interests of a self-representing

accused.20 3 Although this amendment was deemed to "codify, and not modify," existing case law,2" I believe it signaled the ICTY's adoption of a more
197.

Zahar, supra note 180, at 258.

'Last Warning'for Zdravko Tolimir, SENSE TRIBUNAL, June 30, 2008, http://www.
198.
sense-agency.com/icty/Iast-warning-for-zdravko-tolimir.29.html ?cat.id= l&news id=8363.
199.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. 1T-05-8812-I, Accused's Motion to the
President of the Tribunal and Members of the Appeals Chamber to Exercise Their Discretion-

ary Powers and Reconsider Their Decision on the Appeal Against the Interlocutory Appeal
Against the Oral Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of 11 December 2007, T 2 (ICTY Apr. 16,
2008).

Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, Transcript, at 109, 113-17 (ICTY
200.
Dec. 11,2007); Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-AR-73.1, Decision on Zdravko
Tolimir's Request for Reconsideration of Appeals Chamber's Decision of 28 March 2008,
2, 12 (ICTY June 18, 2008).

Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, Transcript, at 175-77 (ICTY June 30, 2008).
201.
202.
Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-I, Submission of the Accused to the Registrar of the
Tribunal and the Pre-Trial Chamber Pursuant to the Order of the Pre-Trial Judge dated 30
June 2008 on Disclosure (ICTY July 4, 2008).
203.
See ICTY RPE 2010, supra note 72, R. 45ter.
Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Public Version of the "Consolidated
204.
Decision on Assignment of Counsel, Adjournment and Prosecution Motion for Additional
Time with Separate Opinion of Presiding Judge Antonetti in Annex," 63 (ICTY Nov. 24,
2009).

[Vol. 33:321

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

restrictive approach that shows less solicitude for a defendant's desire to
self-represent. This more restrictive approach can be seen in the Karadi6
Trial Chamber's decisions on time limits and the choice of assigned counsel, which differ markedly from the Segelj Trial Chamber's decisions on
similar issues. 20 5 1 discuss these decisions in more detail below.
The different approaches begin with time limits. Whereas the Segelj
Trial Chamber permitted Segelj a very lengthy pretrial period, the
Karadi6 Trial Chamber ordered trial to commence fifteen months after
Karadi6 arrived in The Hague.2" 6 Karadli6 requested an additional ten
months to prepare for trial, setting forth the specific preparatory tasks that
20 7
he needed to complete and the time necessary for completing them.

Karadi6 also pointed out that the average and medial pretrial periods for
previously tried accused-most of whom had had counsel-were several
months longer than he had been given. 2 8 The Trial Chamber nonetheless
rejected KaradiW's request, determining that Karadic had had enough
time to prepare for trial.2 °9 The Trial Chamber noted that Karadii6 had put

forward a "large volume" of motions and requests during the pretrial period, including a lengthy motion in which he claimed immunity from
prosecution. 2'0 The Trial Chamber suggested that, by doing so, KaradEi6
had wasted time that he should have used to prepare for trial. 2 1 The Ap-

peals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber's decision,

12

endorsing its

23

reasoning and observing that many of the limitations Karadli6 faced were
related to his decision to self-represent. The Appeals Chamber acknowl-

edged that it was obliged to ensure a fair trial for self-represented accused,

205.
Here, I must acknowledge, however, that the different approaches that we see in
gegelj and Karadi may stem more from the different composition of the respective Trial
Chambers than from a broad-based evolution in legal thinking. At the same time, I do believe
that at least some of the divergences I describe result from a newfound willingness on the part
of the ICTY to hold self-representing accused to reasonable standards even when doing so
impinges to some degree on their right of self-representation.
206.
Prosecutor v. Karadir, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Status Conference Transcript, at
436, 454-56 (ICTY Sept. 8, 2009).
207.
Karadi, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Submission on Commencement of Trial, 11 1528 (ICTY Sept. 3, 2009).
208.
Id. 34, Annex I.
209.
Karad~i6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Status Conference Transcript, at 461-62.
210.
See Karadti6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Holbrooke Agreement Motion (ICTY May
25, 2009); Karadti6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Status Conference Transcript, at 455.
211.
Karadid,Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Status Conference Transcript, at 455.
212.
The Appeals Chamber did determine that the Trial Chamber had given Karad~i6
inadequate time to review his marked-up indictment, so it ordered the Trial Chamber to delay
the commencement of the trial for one week, but it otherwise rejected Karadlid's appeal. See
Prosecutor v. Karadi6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.5, Decision on Radovan Karadli6's Appeal of the Decision on Commencement of Trial, 1121-23, 27 (ICTY Oct. 13, 2009).
213.
Id. 21-24.
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but it pointed out that a defendant who chooses to represent himself relinquishes many of the benefits associated with representation by counsel. 1 4
Reasonable minds may differ over whether the Trial Chamber accorded
Karad2i6 sufficient time to prepare for trial, for although Karadi6 chose to
spend much of his pretrial period researching and presenting his immunity
motion instead of preparing for trial, it is also true that his case features a
massive quantity of documents, many of which were disclosed to Karadi6
only a few months before the trial was to begin.2 1 For that reason, and because Karadli5's pretrial period was shorter on average than those of
previous ICTY accused, the Trial Chamber could have provided Karad~i6
more time without attracting negative attention for doing so. 2 16 Indeed, the
Trial Chamber's refusal to grant Karadli6 more time stands in stark contrast
to the accommodation that the ICTY previously accorded Milogevi6 and
Segelj and can reasonably be seen as signaling a new, less tolerant attitude
toward self-representing accused.
Karadli responded to the unfavorable Trial and Appeals Chambers'
rulings by refusing to appear at trial, maintaining that he was not adequately
prepared. The Trial Chamber immediately ordered the registrar to appoint
standby counsel.2 17 Pursuant to this order, the registrar provided KaradMi6
with a list of five lawyers whom the registrar had deemed eligible for appointment. Karadi6 objected to all five, complaining that none of them
were from Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina and that four of the five had
previously represented leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army who had
fought against the Serbs. 218 KaradMi6 nonetheless asked to meet with each of
the counsel, and although he reported that "all of them made an excellent
impression," he asked to see a list of all eligible counsel so that he could
search for a lawyer from his own region.2 19 KaradMi6 maintained that such a
lawyer would be able to prepare for trial more quickly because he or she
would have prior knowledge of the relevant events and would be able to

214.
215.

Id. [ 24.
See Bogdan Ivanisevid, Court May Be Wise to Give Karadi More Time, BALKAN
INSIGHT (Oct. 29, 2009), http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/comment/23295.
216.
Of course, the Trial Chamber's refusal to grant Karadid more time may have
stemmed from the Trial Chamber's desire to comply with the tribunal's Completion Strategy,
as some legal advisors to Karadli6 have alleged. See Karadi, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT,
Submission on Commencement of Trial, 14 (ICTY Sept. 3, 2009).
217.
Karad&iO, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Appointment of Counsel and Order
on Further Trial Proceedings,
25-26 (ICTY Nov. 5, 2009). The appointment of standby
counsel did not end up having considerable practical effect because the Trial Chamber has
permitted Karad~i6 to continue to represent himself so long as he behaves appropriately, but
should he fail to do so, he will then forfeit his right to self-representation and standby counsel
will take over as an assigned counsel to represent him. Id. [ 25, 27.
218.
Karadi, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on the Accused's Motion to Vacate
Appointment of Richard Harvey, 5 (ICTY Dec. 23, 2009).
219.

Id.
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communicate more effectively with Karadi&.220 The registrar declined to provide Karadi6 with such a list and instead appointed Mr. Richard Harvey.
In appointing Harvey, the Registry appeared to diverge markedly from
precedent. Previously, the geSelj Appeals Chamber had strongly suggested
that an accused has the right to select his standby counsel when it stated:
Should a time come when the Trial Chamber [imposes standby
counsel], the Rule 44 list of Counsel should be provided to Segelj
and he should be permitted to select standby counsel from that list.
Alternatively, should the full restoration of Segelj's right to selfrepresentation fail to curb his obstructionist behaviour, the Trial
Chamber would be permitted to proceed to assign counsel to Segelj.
Again ...if the Trial Chamber feels justified in making such a decision, the Rule 44 list of Counsel should be provided to Segelj, and
he should be permitted to select counsel from that list. Should
from the list, the
Segelj refuse to cooperate in selecting counsel
21
Registry may choose counsel at its discretion. '
Although this language indicated that the Registry erred in refusing to
allow Karadli6 to choose his appointed counsel, the Trial Chamber did not
reach that conclusion but rather sought to distinguish eelj. In particular,
the Trial Chamber held that the Appeals Chamber's instructions in SeSelj
were "based on the very specific facts of the Seielj case, which differ considerably" from the facts of Karadi. 222 Among the distinguishing facts
were Segelj's "troubled history" with his standby counsel and the animosity
Se~elj bore toward him.22 3 This pronouncement is surprising because, with
it, the Karadi6 Trial Chamber appears to be asserting that Segelj would
have been permitted to select standby counsel primarily because Segelj had
behaved so badly with standby counsel whom he did not select. Because
Karadif, by contrast, had been polite and professional, the Registry did not
permit him to select counsel.
Because this is not a principled basis for distinguishing the two cases,
one might instead assume that the different conclusions reached in Selelj
and Karadic reflect an evolution in the tribunal's approach toward selfrepresenting accused. Indeed, the Appeals Chamber's decision affirming the
Trial Chamber appears to confirm that different approach. Although it
acknowledged that it had provided Segelj with the right to select appointed
counsel, it noted that the Se.elj decision "was rendered in a unique factual
and procedural context very different from Karadi6's" and asserted that "a
Chamber's context-limited decision to provide for processes beyond those

220.
Id.
221.
Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the
Trial Chamber's Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel, $ 28 (ICTY Dec. 8, 2006).
Karad~i6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on the Accused's Motion to Vacate
222.
Appointment of Richard Harvey, 36.
223.

Id.

36-37.
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guaranteed by the Statute
and the Rules does not create an automatic right
224
to these processes.
As noted above, the other tribunals have rarely had occasion to address
matters of self-representation, so an examination of their jurisprudence is
not especially illuminating. That caveat notwithstanding, the other tribunals
do seem inclined to take earlier and more robust steps to impose reasonable
restrictions on defendants' right of self-representation. For one thing,
whereas it was not until 2008 and the appearance of Karadi6 that the ICTY
adopted Rule 45ter-which authorizes the imposition of counsel on a defendant who wishes to self-represent 2 5-the ICTR adopted the same rule
six years earlier, and the SCSL and the STL have provided their Trial
Chambers with that authority from their inceptions. 2 6 Further, application
of that rule at the SCSL shows that tribunal's greater willingness to reasonably restrict a defendant's right to self-represent.
When the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) trial began, defendant Sam
Hinga Norman asked to represent himself, but the Trial Chamber concluded
that Norman's right of self-representation could only be "exercised with the
assistance of Counsel to be assigned to the trial. 2127 In reaching that decision, the Trial Chamber invoked such factors as the complexity of the case,
the need for the trial to be completed expeditiously, the potential for disruption to the court's calendar, and the need to safeguard the rights of
Norman's coaccused.128 The Trial Chamber also considered the ICTY's selfrepresentation jurisprudence and tried to distinguish Miloevi6 and Seelj by
observing that, unlike Milogevi6 and Segelj, Norman had not requested selfrepresentation until the eve of trial, and Norman had codefendants whose
229
trials could be adversely affected by his self-representation.
Although these factors do constitute actual differences between the cases, they do not appear sufficiently significant to justify the differing
outcomes between the cases. Rather, the procedural histories of Milogevie
and Seielj show that the ICTY maintained a firm commitment to permitting
self-representation even when that self-representation substantially disrupted the trial proceedings. The SCSL's treatment of the issue in Norman, by
contrast, shows none of that commitment.

224.
Prosecutor v. Karadid, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.6, Decision on Radovan
Karadlid's Appeal from Decision on Motion to Vacate Appointment of Richard Harvey, 31
(Feb. 12, 2010).
225.
See ICTY RPE 2010, supra note 72, R. 45ter.
226.
See ICTR R. P. & EvID. 45 (July 6, 2002) (as amended); SCSL Directive, supra
note 72, art. 10; STL RPE, supra note 61, R. 59(F).
227.
Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa (Civil Defence Forces (CDF) Case),
Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court, 32 (June 8, 2004).
228.
Id. IT 26-27.
229.
Id. [ 17-19.
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D. Summary
The foregoing Sections detail an evolution in the regulation of the defense counsel-client relationship across international tribunals. In the early
days of the ICTY-the first modem international tribunal-entry requirements for defense counsel were extraordinarily low, defendants were
permitted to waive virtually any conflict of interest, and they could fire their
counsel virtually at will. As a consequence of these policies, when the ICTY
was established and for many years thereafter, defendants had virtually unlimited discretion in their choice of counsel. In addition, defendants also
could choose to eschew defense counsel entirely, and the tribunal showed
tremendous willingness to adapt its proceedings to accommodate that
choice.
In recent years, by contrast, the ICTY has restricted defendants' choices
in all of these areas, and subsequent international tribunals have continued
that trend by adopting more restrictive policies from their inceptions. Now,
to be clear, although I believe that these restrictions constitute a clear and
important evolution in the tribunals' policies, as I will discuss in Part III, I
do not mean to suggest that the restrictions are unduly restrictive. Yes, the
tribunals have imposed additional entry requirements on counsel wishing to
defend indigent defendants, but these entry requirements are not overly burdensome.230 Yes, the tribunals have limited their defendants' ability to waive
certain conflicts of interest, but similar or more onerous restrictions are
found in most domestic codes of conduct. 3 1 Finally, although the ICTY
does seem intent on keeping Tolimir and Karadli6 on a tighter leash than
previous self-representing accused, its true resolve is hard to measure because Tolimir and KaradEi6 have not pushed the tribunal with the tactics of
their predecessors. Accordingly, though an evolution is underway, I do not
wish to overstate either its novelty or its real-world impact: international
criminal defendants continue to possess substantial discretion to decide
who, if anyone, will represent them.

230.
See ICTR RPE 2009, supra note 72, R. 45(A); ICTY Directive 2006, supra note
72, art. 14; see also ICTY ADC Press Release, supra note 86 (explaining the objectives of the
Association of Defense Counsel and the training component of the association, which, notably, omits mandatory continuing education); cf Starr, supra note 6, at 194-96 (advocating for
the requirement of a "bar exam in international criminal law" for prospective defense counsel
at the ICC and noting that such an exam is not required at the ICTY or ICTR).
231.
Compare CURRENT ICTY CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 89, art. 14(E)(ii)(2) (preventing ICTY defendants from consenting to conflicts of interest that are "likely to
irreversibly prejudice the administration of justice"), with AM. BAR Ass'N [ABA] MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.7 cmt. 15 (2011) (resembling the ICTY's current rule by

prohibiting the American client from consenting to conflicts of interest if the interests of the
client would not be adequately protected by consent), and COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW
SOCIETIES OF EUROPE [CCBE] CHARTER OF CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE EUROPEAN LEGAL
PROFESSION AND CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS § 3.2 (2008), available at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocument/ENCodeof..conductp 11 306748
215.pdf (providing no apparent mechanism for allowing a defendant to waive any conflict).
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At the same time, although the current real-world impact of the evolu-

tion may not be momentous, some of its causes are. Indeed, the following
Part shows that both the defense counsel evolution just described and the
procedural evolution discussed in Part I reflect a far broader, more funda-

mental evolution: the evolution towards legitimacy for international
criminal justice.
Il. EVOLVING TOWARDS LEGITIMACY

On the surface, the evolutions described in Parts I and II are easy to explain. The ICTY's procedural evolution stemmed primarily from a desire to

expedite tribunal proceedings. Early ICTY trials were labeled excessively
lengthy and inefficient, so in order to shorten them, the ICTY amended its
rules to allow judges to exercise greater control over both pretrial and trial

proceedings. The subsequent international tribunals also had efficiency in
mind when they included nonadversarial elements either in their initial sets

of procedural rules or in early revisions of those rules,2 32 although political
considerations2 33 also played a role at some tribunals, as did the desire to
better represent the procedures of civil law countries, 2 34 many of which are

among the staunchest supporters of international criminal justice.
Some of the restrictions that the tribunals have placed on the defendants' choice of counsel also stemmed from a desire to reduce the length and

cost of trials. When the tribunal permitted defendants to fire counsel virtually at will, trials were delayed because every time a defendant discharged his
counsel, the proceedings had to be suspended to provide the defendant's

new lawyer sufficient time to learn the case. 235 Reducing the number of
counsel changes thereby reduced delay. Similarly, the ICTY's willingness to
accommodate self-representing defendants was contributing to the high cost

232.

See, e.g.,

ANTONIO CASSESE, REPORT ON THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

SUBMITTED BY THE INDEPENDENT EXPERT 20-21 (2006); GEERT-JAN KNOOPS, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 7 (2005)

(noting inquisitorial elements in ICTR procedure adopted to enhance efficiency); Gilbert Bitti,
Two Bones of Contention Between Civil and Common Law: The Record of the Proceedings
and the Treatment of a Concursus Delictorum, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 273, 275-76; Matthew Gillett
& Matthias Schuster, The Special Tribunalfor Lebanon Swiftly Adopts Its Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 885, 886-87 (2009).
233.
Ambos, supra note 2, at 7-9 (arguing that the powers of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber
derive less from a particular legal system and more from a political compromise).
234.
Silvia A. Fermindez de Gurmendi, InternationalCriminal Law Procedures, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 217, 220 (Roy S.
Lee ed., 1999).
235.
See Comprehensive Report, supra note 6,
49-51; JARINDE TEMMINCK TUINSTRA,
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 60 (2009). Permitting defendants to
fire counsel virtually at will also creates incentives for defendants to engage in fee splitting
with their counsel, a practice the tribunals have sought to eliminate. See, e.g., id. at 60.
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and long length of those trials, so the ICTY has become less accommodating in recent years.
By contrast, the introduction of more burdensome qualifications requirements for defense counsel stemmed less from a desire to enhance
efficiency and more from a desire to improve the quality of defense representation. During the ICTY's early years, numerous scholars, judges, and
even defense counsel themselves pointed to deficiencies in defense representation.236 It stood to reason, then, that the ICTY and subsequent tribunals
would seek to address those deficiencies by requiring that counsel be better
credentialed, more experienced, and better able to speak the working languages of the tribunals. Indeed, the most influential factor driving the
ICTY's defense counsel regulation evolution was the ICTY's own experience. As it internalized the negative consequences of the free rein it had
accorded defendants in the use, selection, and retention of counsel, it tightened that rein.
The motivations just described do explain the evolutions, but only in
part. Consider, for one thing, that many of the problems the ICTY later
sought to ameliorate were problems that could have been foreseen at the
tribunal's inception. Commentators have bemoaned the relative inefficiency
of adversarial procedures for decades,2 3 7 and tribunal judges surely were
aware that these procedures, along with the broad discretion they gave defendants to fire their counsel and to self-represent, would substantially
lengthen proceedings. Further, because international criminal trials are procedurally complex and feature a body of law that is unfamiliar to most
defense counsel, the ICTY judges must have known that their failure to impose any meaningful entry requirements on those counsel would result in
suboptimal representation in many cases.
That at least some of these problems could have been anticipated is
shown by the fact that roughly contemporaneous tribunals did anticipate
them-or at least took steps to rectify them far sooner than the ICTY did.
For instance, the ICTR required its defense counsel to meet substantial
qualifications standards as early as 1998, whereas the ICTY did not impose
its (less burdensome) requirements until 2004. Likewise, long before the
ICTY's experience with self-representation had made clear the disruption
that it can cause, the ICTR and the SCSL showed themselves willing to reasonably restrict their defendants' right to self-represent. The Rome Statute
236.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Decision on the First and Third
Rule 115 Defence Motions to Present Additional Evidence Before the Appeals Chamber, 21
nn.62-63 (ICTY June 30, 2005); Ackerman, supra note 75, at 170; Ellis, supra note 6, at 95658; Tolbert, supra note 65, at 975-77; Patricia M. Wald, The InternationalCriminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an
InternationalCourt, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 87, 104-05 (2001).
237.
See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendants Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 931, 939-40, 960 (1983);
Gordon van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 403,408, 465-66, 475-76 (1992).
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also created a far more blended procedural system in July 1998, before the
ICTY added substantial nonadversarial elements to its procedural rules.

So, if the trial inefficiency and counsel incompetency that eventually
motivated the ICTY's procedural and regulatory evolutions were foreseeable-and indeed had motivated other tribunals to make different decisions

from the ICTY-then why did the ICTY initially adopt and later maintain
its laissez-faire attitude for so long? In other words, why would the ICTY be

more reluctant than its contemporary tribunal counterparts both to empower
its judges to exercise reasonable control over its proceedings and to restrict
its defendants' ability to select or eschew counsel? The answer, I believe,

lies in the ICTY's initial, extreme vulnerability and its concomitant vital
need to build credibility and legitimacy.
We now know that the ICTY was the crucial first step on the road to a
modem international criminal law revolution, but, when it was created, its

significance-indeed its very survival-was in considerable doubt. 38 Given
that nearly fifty years had elapsed since the creation of the first international

criminal tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, the mere establishment of the
ICTY was considered to be "[a]gainst great odds."23 9 Its eventual success
was seen as even less likely. The ICTY was established in the midst of an
armed conflict by Western powers that were reluctant to devote military
resources to ending the conflict, so the tribunal was seen less as a principled
effort to extend the reach of criminal accountability to mass murderers and
more as a fig leaf to conceal Western unwillingness to take truly effective
action. 240 The tribunal's legal legitimacy was questioned by those who
doubted the Security Council's authority to establish an international criminal tribunal, 24' and its political legitimacy was under attack because no
tribunal had been established to prosecute the authors of the many atrocities
committed during the fifty years following the World War II trials.2 4 2 Thus,
238.
HAZAN, supra note 7, at 43-64.
239.
SCHARF, supra note 9, at xv; see also Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 360, 361 (1994)
(describing the "perceived political and legal factors which made the effective establishment
of such a tribunal [the ICTY] difficult if not impossible"); Christian Tomuschat, International
Criminal Prosecution:The Precedentof Nuremberg Confirmed, 5 CRIM. L.F. 237, 237 (1994)
("One may call it truly amazing that the international community, acting through the Security
Council, has been able to set up two international criminal jurisdictions in the recent past.").
240.
HAZAN, supra note 7, at 21, 42, 49; David J. Scheffer, Three Memories from the
Year of Origin, 1993, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 353, 353 (2004).
241.
See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion on
Jurisdiction, In 1-2 (ICTY Aug. 10, 1995); Jan M. Sjocrona, The International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia: Some Introductory Remarks from a Defence Point of View, 8
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 463, 464-66 (1995); U.N. Council OKs Yugoslav War Crimes Court, ST.
Louis POsT-DIsPATCH, May 26, 1993, at 8A.
242.
Marcella David, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the International
CriminalCourt and the Commitment to InternationalLaw, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337, 349-50
(1999); Cassandra Jeu, A Successful, Permanent International Criminal Court... "Isn't it
Pretty to Think So?," 26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 411,424-25 (2004).
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the decision to prosecute Yugoslavian offenders was perceived by manyof the former Yugoslavia-as exemplifying biased
both inside and outside
2 43
and selective justice.
Within the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY's legitimacy and impartiality
was even more suspect. Serbs throughout the region considered the tribunal
an illegitimate and biased court that had been established to persecute
them. 2" Bosnian Muslims were more favorably disposed to the tribunal, but
they still viewed it with a healthy dose of skepticism because they perceived
it to be yet another ineffective gesture from an indifferent international
community.145 Finally, the very fact that the tribunal was established while
the war was taking place meant that accurate information was scarce and
that each party to the conflict was able to propound a self-interested narrative that situated its members as victims, not perpetrators.2 46 As Janine Clark
put it: "Truth is an inherently contested concept and nowhere is this more
evident than in [Bosnia and Herzegovina] itself, where essentially three
competing versions of truth exist-the Bognjak, the Serb and the Croataccording to which 'we' were the principal victims and 'they' were the
aggressors. ' 247 Thus, considerable factual uncertainty surrounded the tribunal's early operations, and because no consensus existed regarding who was
doing what to whom, the people of the former Yugoslavia could have little
confidence that the ICTY would accurately assess the legal claims put before it.
Perhaps even more destabilizing than the factual uncertainty surrounding the tribunal's early operations was the legal uncertainty that was just as

Jeu, supra note 242, at 424; Jon Henley, War Tribunal Issues First Indictment,
Nov. 8. 1994, at 10; Time for a Global Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21 1994,
at A14; U.N. Council OKs Yugoslav War Crimes Court, supra note 241, at 8A.
244.
See supra sources accompanying note 26.
245.
Coll, supra note 27, at J8. Included among previous ineffective gestures were several Security Council resolutions imposing an economic embargo on Serbia that had little
practical effect. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 764, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/764 (July 13, 1992); S.C.
Res. 771, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (Aug. 13, 1992); see also SCHARF, supra note 9, at 3435. The Security Council also imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia when Bosnian Serb aircraft
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (Oct. 9,
began to attack civilian targets by air, S.C. Res. 781,
1992), but at the urging of the United Kingdom and France, the clause providing for enforcement of the no-fly zone was omitted from the resolution, and over the next six months, more
than 465 violations of the no-fly zone were documented but ignored. SCHARF, supra note 9, at
35-36.
246.
HAZAN, supra note 7, at 178; Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an Empirical Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 463,
476 (2009); Dan Saxon, Exporting Justice: Perceptions of the ICTY Among the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim Communities in the FormerYugoslavia, 4 J. HUM. RTS. 559, 562 (2005). As
late as 2004, eighty-four percent of Serbian respondents to a public opinion survey believed
that Serbs constituted the largest proportion of war victims. ORENTLICHER, supra note 18, at
60.
247.
Clark, supra note 246, at 476.
243.
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pervasive. The ICTY's original statute comprises a mere ten pages, 248 and

many of its provisions are summary and undetailed. For instance, although
the statute listed the crimes over which the tribunal had jurisdiction, it did
not set forth the elements of those crimes. Consequently, during the tribunal's early years, what exactly the prosecution had to prove or what the
defendant had to defend against was frequently unclear.249 It was only when

the early ICTY cases were adjudicated that, for instance, the elements of
rape, torture, persecution, and inhumane acts, among other crimes, were
delineated. 50 Moreover, the ICTY Statute was completely silent as to de-

fenses. Therefore, in the tribunal's very first case, it had to decide whether
duress could be a defense to an international crime that involved the killing

of a person, 25' and only in later cases did it decide the applicability of other
25 2
defenses.
As a consequence of these circumstances, many early commentatorsand even some tribunal judges-expected the ICTY to fail, 253 and the

248.
The ICTY Statute, supra note 66, was originally drafted as ten pages within a report by the U.N. Secretary-General, and that report, including the statute, was then approved
by a Security Council resolution in May 1993. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), at 36,
U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex (May 3, 1993); S.C. Res. 827, supra note 66.
249.
See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1 -T, Opinion and Judgement, 694 (ICTY
May 7, 1997) (noting that persecution as a crime against humanity "has never been clearly
defined"); Louise Arbour, Foreword to SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS, at

ix-x (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000) ("[C]ertain elements of
certain offences and doctrines of criminal responsibility, and a myriad of issues of procedure
and evidence remain to be elaborated in all their detail."); Developments in the LawInternational Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1998 (2001) ("The crimes within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR-genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes as described in the Geneva and Hague Conventions-were vaguely defined
and seldom enforced prior to the creation of the tribunals."); Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav War
Crimes Tribunal: An Interim Assessment, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 18 n.9
(1997); Sjdcrona, supra note 241, at 470-73 (describing the many questions posed by the
ICTY's jurisdictional provisions on war crimes and crimes against humanity).
250.
See Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Judgment, IT 174-85 (ICTY
Dec. 10, 1998) (defining rape); Prosecutor v. Kupregki6 et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement,
562-66, 582-627 (ICTY Jan. 14, 2000) (discussing persecution and inhumane acts);
Prosecutor v. Delali6, Mucic, Delic & Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement,
446-97
(ICTY Nov. 16, 1998) (discussing torture); Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement, 1 727-30, 748 (discussing inhumane acts).
251.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment,
16, 19 (ICTY Oct. 7,
1997).
252.
See Prosecutor v. Delalid, Mucic, Delic & Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, T 525 (ICTY Feb. 20, 2001) (finding the defense of necessity to be inapplicable "in
relation to an allegation of active mistreatment of detainees"); Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al.,
Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, $ 706 (ICTY Nov. 2, 2001) (rejecting voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor in sentencing).
253.
See, e.g., HAZAN, supra note 7, at 49; D'Amato, supra note 13, at 501-02; David P.
Forsythe, Politicsand the InternationalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 401,

MichiganJournalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 33:321

international community initially seemed content to let it do so. The United
Nations provided the ICTY with such inadequate resources during its early
years 254 that the tribunal's first prosecutor unofficially threatened to resign if
funding were not increased 5 The ICTY received even less enforcement
support, a failure that posed an even greater threat to the tribunal's survival.
During its first two years, the ICTY had no defendants in custody. By
Spring 1998, the tribunal had issued 205 arrest warrants, but the states of
the former Yugoslavia had executed only six. 25 6 Although successive ICTY
Presidents presented numerous reports to the Security Council complaining
about lack of state cooperation, the Security Council "failed to respond in a
meaningful way."257 Other states, for their parts, were reluctant to assist in

enforcement; they allegedly refused to provide the tribunal key intelligence
information, and they declined to order the 60,000 peacekeepers in Bosnia
to arrest tribunal indictees. 251 Thus, although the NATO-led peacekeeping

force in Bosnia had the authority to arrest ICTY indictees, it declined to do
so and indeed "went out of its way to avoid arresting suspects, reportedly
waving KaradMi6 and other suspects through NATO checkpoints. '259 The
ICTY's enforcement difficulties were so severe that Ted Meron, one of the
international community
tribunal's staunchest champions, suggested that the
2 60
should either support the tribunal or shut it down.

402-04, 414-15, 419 (1994) (stating that the obstacles to the success of the international crim-

inal court for the former Yugoslavia remain "profound").
See, e.g., STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS,
254.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN

RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY
SCHARF,

(1998).
255.

supra note 9, at 79-84; THEODOR

188 (1997);

MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE

280

Tomuschat, supra note 239, at 21 n.8.

256.
McDonald, supra note 10, at 563. This dismal enforcement record led the tribunal
to label itself "a partial failure-through no fault of its own because the vast majority of
indictees continue to remain free, seemingly enjoying absolute immunity." Id.; ICTY President, Fourth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsiblefor Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General,

175, U.N. Doc. A/52/375-S/1997/729 (Sept. 18, 1997).
257.

McDonald, supra note 10, at 562.

Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Reflections on the Contributions of the International
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 155, 160
(2001); see also MERON, supra note 254, at 281; Payam Akhavan, Justice in The Hague,
Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal,
20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 795-96 (1998) (discussing the international community's "unwilling[ness] to make the sacrifices necessary to arrest indicted persons"); Mary Margaret
258.

Criminal Tribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia, 24

Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in InternationalCriminal Law, 15 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 358 (1999); Schrag, supra note 249, at 22 (arguing that NATO's failure
to arrest Karadi6 and Mladi6 "is accurately seen as a symptom of the international community's ambivalence towards the Tribunal").
259.
ORENTLICHER, supra note 26, at 28; see also HAZAN, supra note 7, at 92.
260.
Theodor Meron, Answering for War Crimes: Lessons From the Balkans, FOREIGN
AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 2.
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Frrd6ric Mgret has observed that "international criminal trials are

uniquely prone to being suspected of bias since they operate in an environment traditionally characterized by particularly intense conflicts of interest
along
and values. 2 61 Certainly, that observation applied to the ICTY, and it,
with the other circumstances just described, placed the ICTY in a uniquely
vulnerable position even as compared to the other international criminal
tribunals. For instance, although the ICTR suffered similar funding and

staffing deficiencies in its early

days,

262

it was able to gain custody over

high-level indictees very soon after it was established 263 and thereby gained

an important measure of credibility. Further, although the government of
Rwanda has criticized various aspects of ICTR proceedings,"6 it has always
supported the tribunal's prosecutorial goals and has, for the most part, complied with tribunal orders and requests. 265 The people of Rwanda, moreover,
Frrdric Mrgret, Beyond "Fairness": Understandingthe Determinantsof Interna261.
tional Criminal Procedure, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 37, 71 (2009).
See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda: A Law262.
yers Committee Report on the ICTR and National Trials, at VI(A)-(B) (July 1997)
(unpublished working paper) (on file with Columbia International Affairs Online); RATNER &
ABRAMS, supra note 254, at 188.
263.
See Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargainingof
InternationalCrimes, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 67 n.279 (2002).
Rwanda has complained about the length and inefficiency of ICTR proceedings.
264.
Pernille Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca: Seeking Alternative Means to Justice, Peace and
Reconciliation, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 31, 35-36 (2002); Victor Peskin, Courting Rwanda:
The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme,3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 950, 951
(2005). Some governmental officials have also suggested that the ICTR's budget would be
better spent on other measures. See e.g., JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 3, at 26; Aloys
Habimana, Judicial Responses to Mass Violence: Is the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for
Rwanda Making a Difference Towards Reconciliation in Rwanda?, in INTERNATIONAL WAR
CRIMES: MAKING A DIFFERENCE?: PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE AT

83, 86 (Steven R. Ratner & James L. Bischoff
eds., 2004) [hereinafter MAKING A DIFFERENCE]. Rwanda was also unhappy with the decision
to locate the tribunal outside of Rwanda. See Timothy Longman, The Domestic Impact of the
InternationalCriminal TribunalforRwanda, in MAKING A DIFFERENCE, supra, at 39; JUSTICE
DELAYED, supra note 3, at 19 (recommending that ICTR trials be conducted in Rwanda).
Even with respect to these issues, however, Rwanda's view of the ICTR has improved over
time. See Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice: External
Perceptions of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
21, 28 (2002).
265.
Although generally supportive of the ICTR, Rwanda has occasionally retaliated
against tribunal rulings and prosecutorial investigations of which it disapproved. See KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, RWANDA'S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 140 (2005)
(describing Rwanda's refusal to issue visas to permit Rwandan witnesses to travel to the ICTR
in retaliation for the prosecutor's investigation of the alleged crimes of the Rwanda Patriotic
Front (RPF)); Franck Petit, CameroonianIntrigues, INT'L JUST. TRIB., Mar. 5, 2001 (describing Rwanda's intention to "suspend all relations" with the ICTR following a November 1999
ruling ordering the release of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza because of procedural errors);
ICTR/Prosecution-Synthesis:Prosecutorsat the ICTR, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 29,
2003 (describing Rwanda's response to the Barayagwiza ruling as well as its opposition to the
ICTR's investigation into crimes allegedly committed by members of the RPF).
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW
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have held a generally positive view of the tribunal, with a majority believing
266
that the tribunal has functioned well and that it is fair to all ethnic groups.
As for the SCSL, Sierra Leoneans have appeared even more favorably disposed. Although Sierra Leoneans do register some complaints about the

tribunal, 267 in a nationwide survey, overwhelming majorities of them expressed their belief that the SCSL has contributed to peace building and that
its trials are fair and help to deter future violence.2

68

Indeed, Donna Arzt

compared local impressions of the early SCSL with those of the ICTY and
concluded that, in contrast to the mistrust that pervades local views about

the ICTY, "receptiveness toward the Special Court is rather broad, with
concerns expressed
more in regard to details and implementation than over269
all legitimacy."

The ICTY was not the recipient of such favorable initial impressions,
and the challenging circumstances and deep-seated distrust that surrounded
its early work rendered it uniquely vulnerable and subject to perceptions of
illegitimacy. It is this vulnerability and concomitant need to build legitimacy that drove both the ICTY's initial procedural and regulatory choices and
its decision to retain many of those choices after other international tribunals had rejected them. Indeed, as I will argue in the following pages,
adopting adversarial procedures and permitting them to be utilized by a
266.
Longman, supra note 264, at 37-38. Interestingly, in a reverse of the ethnically
self-interested views about the ICTY that prevail amongst the people of the former Yugoslavia, the ICTR has more support among Rwandan Hutus (who have been the ICTR's exclusive
target) than among their Tutsi compatriots. Id. at 38. Rwandan Hutus, however, do believe that
the tribunal should prosecute members of the RPF for their alleged crimes against Hutus. Id.;
JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 3, at 19; Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts:
Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
347,418 (2006).
267.
Some Sierra Leoneans complain, for instance, that the SCSL should have indicted
more perpetrators, and many believe that it should not have indicted Sam Hinga Norman.
Additionally, some assert that the resources devoted to the SCSL might have been put to better
use. INT'L CRISIS GRP., THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF

A "NEW MODEL" 10

(2003);

RACHEL KERR & JESSICA LINCOLN, KING'S COLL. LONDON, THE

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: OUTREACH, LEGACY AND IMPACT FINAL REPORT

21-23

(2008);

TOM PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE UNDER SCRUTINY 2, 28, 30-31, 38 (Prosecution Case

Studies Series 2006); Donna E. Arzt, Views on the Ground: The Local Perception of International Criminal Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, 603 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCl. 226, 233 (2006); James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 641-43 (2005); Vincent 0.
Nmehielle & Charles Chemor Jalloh, International Criminal Justice: The Legacy of the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 107, 109 (2006).
268.
MEMUNATU BABY PRATT, NATION-WIDE SURVEY REPORT ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 23-24 (2007) (on file with author); see also
Arzt, supra note 267, at 233 ("Despite endless debate about its cost and legitimacy ...Sierra
Leoneans welcomed the court. We saw it not only as a mechanism for transnational justice but
also as an instrument to transform our judicial system.... Nobody therefore challenged the
court's existence.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
269.
Arzt, supra note 267, at 233.
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lawyer of the defendant's choice stood as the only viable options for an institution as weak and mistrusted as the ICTY.

To make this argument, I must provide a brief description of adversarial
and nonadversarial procedures. Criminal proceedings in an adversarial system are structured in the form of a contest between the defendant and the
state. The adversarial model charges the parties with investigating the facts,
researching the law, and presenting the case in the manner most favorable to

their own positions.27 Thus, in an adversarial system, it is the parties who
are responsible for unearthing the evidence, determining what arguments to
advance, and deciding how best to support those arguments. In other words,
the parties decide which witnesses to call, in what order to call them, and
what questions to ask, among many other decisions. Trial judges and lay
jurors are expected to passively receive the evidence presented by the parties. Although trial judges are authorized to ask questions, doing so is

frowned upon, and judicial interventions are unlikely to be meaningful in
any event because judges in adversarial systems are kept uninformed about
the facts of their cases prior to trial.27 i

As the prior description reveals, proceedings in an adversarial system
are driven by the parties. In contrast, proceedings in a nonadversarial
system are driven by the judiciary. Some nonadversarial criminal justice
systems place pretrial investigations in the hands of an investigating judge,
who is charged with collecting both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. 27 2 Other nonadversarial systems do not use investigating judges;
however, even in nonadversarial systems in which the parties play a more
robust role in the pretrial investigations, at trial it is the presiding judge who
determines which witnesses to call and who takes the lead in questioning
those witnesses. 273 It is only after the presiding judge has concluded her
questioning that the lawyers have the opportunity to suggest additional

See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 43 (5th ed. 2009); LUBAN,
270.
supra note 1, at 57; Sward, supra note 28, at 302.
271.
Mirjan Dama~ka, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1083, 1090-91 (1975). That is, because judges in an adversarial system do not become familiar with the evidence before trial, they do not know where the evidentiary
weaknesses lie and therefore are unable to question the parties effectively.
See, e.g., Christine van den Wyngaert, Belgium, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS
272.
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 9 (Christine van den Wyngaert et al. eds., 1993); Richard
Vogler, Criminal Procedurein France, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14, 19 (John
Hatchard et al. eds., 1996). For a discussion of the powers of investigation held by judges in
various countries, see Denis Salas, The Role of the Judge, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 488, 506-09 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & JR. Spencer eds., 2002).
273.
GERHARD ROBBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 189 (1998); Mary C.
Daly, Some Thoughts on the Differences in Criminal Trials in the Civil and Common Law
Legal Systems, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 65, 70 (1999); Damaika, supra note 271,
at 1088; Joachim Herrmann, Bargaining Justice-A Bargainfor German Criminal Justice?,
53 U. PITT. L. REV. 755, 760 (1992); Edward A. Tomlinson, NonadversarialJustice: The
French Experience, 42 MD. L. REV. 131, 143 (1983); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 272, at
33.
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questions. 274 Consequently, as Mirjan Dama~ka puts it, in a nonadversarial
trial, the "bulk of information is obtained through judicial interrogation, and
only a few informational crumbs are left to the parties. ' 275 The presiding
judge is also authorized to raise any issues relevant to the charges and can

"even hear evidence not formally put forward by the parties. ' 276 Not surprisingly, therefore, most commentators consider the key difference between
adversarial and nonadversarial proceedings to27be
that the former are party
7
dominated, and the latter are judge dominated.

This key difference reflects the two systems' very different ideological
underpinnings. By placing so much control in the hands of the parties, adversarial systems manifest respect for litigant autonomy and party
participation278 while expressing a concomitant distrust of the state and state

officials. Mirjan Dama~ka has noted, for instance, that adversarial systems
are founded on traditional Lockean liberal values that include distrust of the

state 279 and a "complementary demand for safeguards against abuse" by
state officials. 280 Other commentators have echoed this understanding of the
adversarial system,281 and have contrasted it with the "collectivistic values

274.
See LUBAN, supra note 1,at 94-95 (noting that in Germany lawyers rarely ask
more than a couple of questions, both because the judge has typically asked all of the relevant
questions and because intruding further might be taken as criticism of the judge's work); Tomlinson, supra note 273, at 143 (observing that during trials in the French assize courts, "[t]he
number of questions proposed by the other participants is usually quite limited, however, and
the president plainly dominates the courtroom proceeding").
275.
Dama~ka, supra note 271, at 1089.
276.
See Mirjan Dama~ka, Evidentiary Barriersto Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure:A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 559 (1973).
277.
Philippe Bruno, The Common Law from a Civil Lawyer's Perspective, in INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS 1, 5 (Richard A. Danner & Marie-Louise H. Bernal
eds., 1994); Daly, supra note 273, at 67-68 (observing that "[i]n the [nonadversariall civil law
system, the judges-not the parties--drive the criminal process"); Mirjan Damalka, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45
AM. J. CoMp. L. 839, 841 (1997) ("[W]hile the continental criminal judge takes the lion's
share of factfinding activity, in Anglo-American lands procedural action is to a much greater
extent in the hands of the lawyers for the prosecution and the defense."); Van Kessel, supra
note 237, at 431 ("A central difference between the adversary and nonadversary systems is
that in the latter the judge controls the process rather than the lawyers.").
278.
See Sward, supra note 28, at 302, 310, 318, 324 (observing that party control is
understood to preserve individual autonomy and dignity because it "giv[es] litigants the fullest
voice possible" in their cases). Lon Fuller believed, for instance, that "[t]he essence of the
adversary system is that each side is accorded a participation in the decision that is reached, a
participation that takes the form of presenting proofs and arguments." Fuller, supra note 28, at
41.
279.
Dama~ka, supra note 276, at 565.
280.
Id. at 583.
281.
See, e.g., STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND
DEFENSE 49-51 (1984); RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 355 (2001);
Frank J. Macchiarola, Findingthe Truth in an American Criminal Trial: Some Observations,5
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 97, 99 (1997); Mgret, supra note 261, at 46; Marian Neef &
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and benevolent paternalism" that underpin nonadversarial procedural systems 282 and the trust in state officials that these systems reflect. 283 As Nico
Jorg and his coauthors put it, nonadversarial systems are premised on the
notion that "the state is the benevolent and most powerful protector and
guarantor of public interest and can ...be trusted to 'police' itself."284 They
go on to observe that nonadversarial procedures "function by virtue of soci-

ety's faith in the fundamental commitment of state institutions to act in the
interests of justice (in all senses of the word)."285 Karl Llewellyn built upon
these themes in sketching contrasting criminal justice models whose procedures bear striking resemblances to adversarial and nonadversarial
procedures and whose underlying ideologies reflect the attitude toward officials described above. Llewellyn, for instance, contrasted the "parental"
system of criminal justice with that of the "arm's length" system, describing
the former as based on a "feeling of groupness," or "We-ness, ' 2 86 that sees
the defendant as an integral part of the community. By contrast, the "arm's
length" system-which Llewellyn describes as a caricature of the modern
adversarial system-views the defendant as a "person quite outside the

community," whom the officials can take hold of only if they can pin upon
him some specific act. 287 Llewellyn delineates one of the basic characteris288
tics of the arm's length system as distrust of officials.

Merely to describe nonadversarial procedures as conceptualizing the
state as a benevolent protector of public interest, capable and willing to
police itself, is to show how extraordinarily unsuitable those procedures

would have been for early ICTY proceedings. If the use of the adversarial
system in the United States is understood to reflect Americans' notorious

Stuart Nagel, The Adversary Nature of the American Legal System from a HistoricalPerspective, 20 N.Y. L.F. 123, 156 (1974).
282.
Damalka, supra note 276, at 565.
283.
Id. at 583-84 ("[T]he ideology supporting modem non-adversary procedure ...
exhibits much less distrust of police, prosecutors, judges, and public officials in general.");
Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 2
(1997); M6gret, supra note 261, at 46; cf Luna, supra note 30, at 300 (contrasting "the civil
law tradition [that] was not forged in an abiding distrust of centralized authority").
284.
Jorg et al., supra note 30, at 44; see also DAMA§KA, supra note 31, at 173.
285.
Jorg et al., supra note 30, at 55; see also id. at 43 ("[L]egitimacy of the inquisitorial
procedure in a democratic context requires an inordinate amount of faith in the integrity of the
state and its capacity to pursue truth .... ").

286.

LLEWELLYN,

supra note 30, at 448.

287.
Id. at 445.
288.
Id. at 444-45. Similarly, John Griffiths contrasts the family model of the criminal
justice process with the battle model, predicating the latter "on the idea that there is in the
domain of the criminal process an irreconcilable conflict between the individual and the state"
and the former "on the proposition of reconcilable interests, even a state of love. While the
family model implies a basic trust in public officials, the battle model is characterized by a
lack of faith in them." Dama9ka, supra note 276, at 572.
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distrust for their governmental officials,289 consider the procedural implications of the far more virulent skepticism and mistrust that pervaded the
ICTY at its inception. Indeed, consider the following summary: In the midst
of a brutal war in which each party to the conflict believed itself to be entirely right and its opponents entirely wrong, the U.N. Security Council
used a somewhat novel legal mechanism to establish an international criminal tribunal, following fifty years in which international crimes all over the
globe had gone unprosecuted. The international tribunal was charged with
prosecuting genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, but it was
not told what those crimes were or what defenses could be brought against
them. The international tribunal also was not initially provided sufficient
funds or enforcement support to carry out its work in even a minimally effective way. The tribunal's judges were charged with drafting the new
tribunal's procedural rules, and they therefore had the authority to structure
the tribunal's proceedings along either adversarial or nonadversarial lines.
But although the judges had the theoretical ability to craft nonadversarial
trial proceedings in which the judges took the lead in deciding which witnesses to call and what questions to ask, because such nonadversarial
procedures are founded on "collectivistic values," "benevolent paternalism' 2 0 and trust for state officials, they would have had no ideological
grounding in the early ICTY Uncertainty and skepticism about every aspect
of the tribunal abounded during its early years, and that uncertainty and
skepticism rendered it impossible to adopt a set of procedures that presupposed trust between citizen and state and between litigant and the judicial
system. Under these circumstances, the only viable procedural system for
the early ICTY was the procedural system that bestows upon the parties
maximum control over their cases. That is, the only viable procedural system for the early ICTY was the adversary system.
Further, it is not merely that the ideological underpinnings of the
adversary system are in far better alignment with the perceptions and reality
of the early ICTY. In addition, social psychology research of the last few
decades shows that adversarial procedures had considerable potential to
provide the ICTY other key benefits. In the past, social psychologists
assumed that people assessed the desirability of procedural systems
primarily on the basis of the outcomes they received under those systems, 91
but the seminal work of John Thibaut and Laurens Walker showed that
individuals' preferences for one set of procedures over another are in fact
substantially predicated on their perceptions of the fairness of those

289.
See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY
33 (1981); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 15

(2001).
290.

Dama~ka, supra note 276, at 565.

291.

LIND

& TYLER, supra note 32, at 1.
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procedures. 292 That is, as Allan Lind and Tom Tyler put it, "fairness is29a3
major and very likely the major determinant of procedural preferences.
Following upon Thibaut and Walker's studies, subsequent researchers have
shown that individuals who believe that the procedures used in their cases
were fair view the legal officials, judicial institutions, and the specific
outcomes of their cases more favorably. Indeed, as a general matter,
assessments of procedural fairness lead to "greater overall satisfaction with
the legal experience and more positive affect with respect to an encounter
with the justice system. 294 Two studies in this vein, for instance, examined
the views of convicted felons and showed that a defendant's evaluation of
his overall experience in the criminal justice system is heavily influenced by
his assessment of whether his case was handled fairly.2 95 Researchers
conclude, therefore, that the use of procedures perceived to be fair provides
"a cushion for authorities when the outcomes they have provided are
unfavorable. '296 That is, when procedures perceived to be fair are used,
individual views about authorities remain positive, whereas when
procedures perceived to be unfair are used, "negative outcomes lead to
negative affect toward the authorities involved. '297 Finally, and most
relevant here, research shows that people are more likely to accept and obey
negative decisions when they believe those decisions were made pursuant to
29
fair procedures. 1
The research just canvassed took place within the context of stable
groups that have existing authority structures. These authorities are widely
considered to be legitimate and therefore entitled to obedience. However,
studies show that the fairness effect I have described is less influential in the
context of authorities with questionable legitimacy. In particular, when individuals doubt the legitimacy of an authority, they are less willing to defer to
the authority's decisions on the basis that the decisions were made fairly.
Rather, they will focus more on the favorability of the decision.2 99 Thus, a
292.
JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 68, 74 (1975).
293.
LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 34.
294.
Id. at 70.
295.
Id. at 73; Jonathan D. Casper et al., ProceduralJustice in Felony Cases, 22 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 483, 483 (1988); Jean M. Landis & Lynne Goodstein, When Is Justice Fair?An
IntegratedApproach to the Outcome Versus Procedure Debate, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 675,
675, 706-07 (1986).
296.
LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 7 1.
297.
Id. at 72.
298.

LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 81-82; see also MACCOUN ET AL., ALTERNATIVE

ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM

56-57, 60-62 (1988); Katherine M. Kitzman & Robert E. Emery, Procedural Justice and
Parents' Satisfaction in a Field Study of Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 553, 554 (1993); Lind et al., supra note 33, at 240, 245-47 (1993); Tyler, supra note
33, at 119.

299.

Tyler, supra note 33, at 120.
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central goal for new authorities must be to gain legitimacy, and fairness assessments also play a key role in this quest. In particular, if "people view or
personally experience the authorities as making decisions fairly, they increasingly view them as legitimate. Over time, this legitimacy shapes
deference, which becomes increasingly independent of the favourability of
policies and decisions. '3°° In other words, the key ingredient that shapes an
individual's assessment of an institution's legitimacy-legitimacy that leads
individuals to defer to the decisions of that institution-is the fairness of the
procedures through which institutions exercise their authority.
Because the perception of fair procedures is so influential to so many
realms, it becomes crucial to determine what procedures are perceived to be
most fair. Through a series of studies, Thibaut and Walker concluded that
individuals across legal cultures consider adversarial procedures to be fairer
than nonadversarial procedures. 30 1 When they sought to determine why adversarial procedures were consistently viewed as fairer, their studies
consistently showed the key differentiating element to be the litigants' level
of control over the process. That is, "procedures that vest process control in
those affected by the outcome of the procedure are viewed as more fair than
are procedures that vest process control in the decision maker."3 2 Thibaut
303
and Walker's findings were replicated in numerous subsequent studies
that show not only the importance of process control for litigants but the
reasons for that importance: litigants desire process control not so much
because they believe it will enable them to achieve better outcomes, but
rather for the opportunity it provides them to express their opinions and
arguments; that is, to tell their side of the story.3° 4 Thus, "voice," or the capacity to have one's feelings heard, appears to be a critical factor in

300.

Id.

THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 292, at 78-80. Subsequent researchers replicated
this finding. See Stephen LaTour, Determinants of Participantand Observer Satisfaction with
Adversary and InquisitorialModes of Adjudication, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1531, 1543 (1978). Some later studies, however, suggested that culture plays a more influential role in procedural preferences than Thibaut and Walker's research indicated. Cf Rebecca
A. Anderson & Amy L. Otto, Perceptions of Fairness in the Justice System: A Cross-Cultural
Comparison, 31 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 557 (2003); Kwok Leung, Some Determinants
of Reactions to ProceduralModels for Conflict Resolution: A Cross-NationalStudy, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 898, 898 (1987).
LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 35; see also Robert Folger & Jerald Greenberg,
302.
Procedural Justice: An Interpretive Analysis of Personnel Decisions, in 3 RESEARCH IN PERSONNEL AND HUMAN RESEARCH MANAGEMENT 141, 153 (Kendrith Rowland & Gerald Ferris
eds., 1985) ("[T]he research on dispute resolution, whether in legal or nonlegal settings, clearly indicates that procedures giving disputing parties control over the resolution process are
preferred to those that do not offer any such process control.").
303.
Pauline Houlden et al., Preferencesfor Modes of Dispute Resolution as a Function
of Process and Decision Control, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 13, 26-27 (1978);
LaTour, supra note 301, at 1543.
304.
LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 101.

301.
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procedural fairness judgments. 0 5 For that reason, rules that prevent litigants
from presenting issues that they believe are important (even if they actually
are not) have the effect of restricting process control and thereby "lead to
feelings of procedural unfairness."3 6
As is apparent, this research is highly relevant to the ICTY because it
suggests that adversarial procedures were not only a far better ideological fit
for the early tribunal but that they also had the potential to strengthen the
tribunal by enhancing its fledgling legitimacy. The early ICTY was not considered a legitimate criminal justice system in the eyes of its defendants or
most of their compatriots. The tribunal could not hope to gain legitimacy
overnight; indeed, to this day the tribunal struggles to appear legitimate to
certain constituencies. 7 Nonetheless, it was crucial for the tribunal to take
what steps it could to enhance its authority and build its credibility. Because
adversarial procedures are considered fairer than nonadversarial procedures,
and because perceptions of fairness lead to perceptions of legitimacy as well
as to deference, adversarial procedures were the obvious choice for a tribunal as weak and vulnerable as the ICTY.
Recall, though, that the key element leading to perceptions of fairness is
process control. Litigants consider adversarial procedures to be fairer because adversarial procedures permit litigants greater control over the
presentation of their cases. That is, adversarial procedures permit litigants to
make many of the strategic and expressive decisions that judges typically
make in nonadversarial systems. But even within adversarial criminal justice systems, the level of process control afforded to litigants can vary as a
system's evidentiary rules, time limits, and witness procedures can preclude
litigants from making certain arguments. Additionally, and even more fundamentally, a litigant's process control can be inhibited because, even in an
adversarial system, it is not the litigant but the litigant's lawyer who controls much of the process. In the United States, for instance, criminal
defendants have the last word about the "ends" of representation; conse309
308
quently, it is they who decide whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial,
or launch an appeal.31 However, it is the defendant's lawyer who retains
decision-making authority over the "means" of the representation; thus, it is
the lawyers who decide which witnesses to call, what questions to ask them,

305.
Blair H. Sheppard, Justice Is No Simple Matter: Case for ElaboratingOur Model
of ProceduralFairness,49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 953, 954, 959 (1985); Tom R.
Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 74, 79 (1985).
306.

LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 95.

307.
308.

See ORENTLICHER, supra note 18, at 16, 21.

ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION, Standard 4-5.2(a)(i) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].

309.
See Graves v. P.J. Taggares Co., 616 P.2d 1223, 1228 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 308, Standard 4-5.2.
310.

See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
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and how to sculpt the arguments that make up the case.31' Even domestic
defendants may resent these restrictions on their process control, particularly if they suspect that their lawyers are not entirely loyal or are not working
their hardest to secure a favorable outcome.3 12 However, most domestic

criminal defendants do experience some measure of process control because
their lawyers seek to advance the broad goals the defendants wish advanced
in the general way they wish them advanced.3 13 In particular, both defend-

ants and their lawyers typically seek either an acquittal or the lowest
available sentence.
In contrast to domestic defendants, an ICTY defendant's experience of
process control is more greatly impacted by the use of a lawyer because the
goal alignment between defendants and lawyers that we presume with domestic defendants and their lawyers cannot be presumed at the ICTY. For
instance, whereas domestic defendants virtually always seek an acquittal, or
at least a lowered sentence, ICTY defendants are far more likely to seek
alternative or additional goals. Some ICTY defendants are focused less on

precluding or minimizing punishment and more on proclaiming their ver34
sion of the conflict to their compatriots and the international community.
They may believe that their acquittal is impossible at the ICTY,31 5 or they
may prefer to use their trial as a platform to influence local politics or to

311.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977); Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d
149, 155 (2d Cir. 1983); State v. Rodriguez, 612 P.2d 484, 489 (Ariz. 1980); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 308, Standard 4-5.2(b).
312.
Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a
PublicDefender, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 4, 7 (1971). Concern about lawyers' loyalty
was particularly prevalent among defendants who were represented by public defenders; many
such defendants believed that public defenders owed a certain loyalty to the state because the

state paid the public defenders' salary. JONATHAN D.
THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE

CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:

105, 110-13 (1972).

313.
See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011) (requiring lawyers to "abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and ... [to]
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued"); In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717, 724 n.14 (1973) ("[T]he duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an 'officer of the
court,' is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful means, even when those interests
are in conflict with the interests of the United States or of a State.") (citation omitted).
314.
WALD, supra note 162, at 37; see also Scharf & Rassi, supra note 162, at 5-6.
315.
See Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-99-37-I, Initial Appearance Transcript, at
4-5 (ICTY July 3, 2001); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in
InternationalCriminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 550 (1998) (describing some defense
counsel who do not believe that acquittals are possible at the ICTY); Milosevic's Appeal, BBC
NEWS (Apr. 3, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/mediareports/1257621.stm;
see also Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-I, Submission of the Accused to the Tribunal Concerning the Deception of the Public and the Disturbance to My Family Caused by
False Statements Made by the Registry and the Political and Media Pressures It Has Exerted
on the Tribunal, 5 (ICTY Oct. 8, 2007) (showing the accused argued that the Registry was
trying to deny him his right to self-represent and "impose on [him] a counsel who will, in [his]
name, accept the pleas bargained by the Registry and the Prosecutor's Office").
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enhance their image and legacy in the world outside of the ICTY.316 In addi-

tion, even when ICTY defendants do seek "traditional" goals, they are more
likely than domestic defendants to try to advance them through "untraditional" means. For instance, they might seek an acquittal not through
painstaking engagement with the evidence the prosecution has presented but
by attacking the legitimacy of the tribunal3" 7 or the impartiality of the judges.318 The problem is that these alternative goals and tactics are ones that

many defense counsel are unwilling to advance. Under these circumstances,
where the potential for divergence between the lawyers' ends and means

and the defendants' ends and means was so great, the decision of who
should select the defendant's counsel or whether he must have counsel at all
became crucial.
Moreover, even where goal divergence was not an issue between ICTY
defendants and their counsel, trust was likely to be. Certainly, even domestic defendants vitally need defense counsel whom they can trust to assist
them in battling the immense power of the state. The comparable needs of

ICTY defendants were even greater, however, for they believed themselves
to be battling not a state but the entire international community that had
banded together to create an institution predisposed to convicting them.3" 9
For this reason, although ICTY officials might have had confidence that any
reputable defense counsel would provide independent and trustworthy assistance, in the circumstances under which the ICTY was established, a
counsel's actual independence was less important than his perceived
316.
See MICHAEL A. NEWTON & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE STATE: THE
TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 110 (2008); WALD, supra note 162, at 47-48;
Scharf & Rassi, supra note 162, at 4-6 (describing Milogevis masterful use of his trial to
influence public opinion in Serbia).
317.
See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion on
Jurisdiction, 1 1-2 (ICTY Aug. 10, 1995).
318.
Prosecutor v. egelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Decision on Motions for Disqualification
of Judge Patrick Robinson, Judge Alphons Orie, and Judge Bakone Justice Moloto, I 1 (ICTY
Nov. 6, 2006); Prosecutor v. Blagojevi6 & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-R, Decision on Motion
for Disqualification, 9N 1-4 (ICTY July 2, 2008); Prosecutor v Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54A-R77.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of Kosta Bulatovic Contempt Proceedings,
17-22 (ICTY Aug. 29, 2005) (separate opinion of Bonomy, J., on contempt of the tribunal); Prosecutor v. Karadid et al., Case No. IT-95-05/18-PT, Decision on Motion to
Disqualify Judge Picard and Report to the Vice President Pursuant to Rule 15(B)(ii),
4-9
(ICTY July 22, 2009); see also WALD, supra note 162, at 12.
In many cases, the accused do not deny the acts they have ordered which are the
basis of the charges; they argue that they did it with beneficent and patriotic motives
...and that they must be allowed to make those motives clear to the public to show
the hypocrisy and perfidy of their accusers.
Id.
319.
See Milogevi6, Case No. IT-99-37-I, Initial Appearance Transcript, at 2-5; Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Motion Hearing Transcript, at 134-40 (ICTY Dec.
11, 2001); Milogevi6, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Pre-Trial Conference Transcript, at 89 (ICTY
Jan. 9, 2002).
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independence. Still more important was the breadth of his perceived independence, for truly trustworthy defense counsel would be independent not
only from the prosecution and tribunal but also from the international community as a whole; that is, the most trustworthy counsel in the eyes of an
ICTY defendant may well be the one who rejects the very assumptions upon which the international criminal justice project is founded.
What sort of defense counsel would this be? Almost by definition, it
will not be the counsel who is most competent in the traditional sense of the
term. The most desirable counsel in the defendant's eyes may not have
knowledge of or experience in the relevant subject matter. This counsel may
not be fluent in the working languages of the tribunal. This counsel may
even be laboring under a conflict of interest that would cause significant
concern in a more traditional representation. But despite these "deficiencies," such counsel may be best placed to assist the defendant by quelling
his fears and presenting his case in the way he would like it presented. In
particular, this counsel will be more willing to tell the defendant's whole
story-not only the legally relevant portions of the story, but also the politically relevant portions; the portions that rally supporters and embarrass the
international community.
In many cases, then, the most desirable lawyer from the defendant's
perspective is the defendant himself. Even some high-profile domestic defendants are unable to find lawyers willing to advance their chosen
defenses,3 20 and ICTY defendants are apt to place even greater value on the
autonomy that self-representation affords. But whether representing themselves or being represented by others, many ICTY defendants desire a
lawyer who can and will refocus the lens from the narrow charges in the
indictment to the broader, more morally ambiguous context surrounding
those charges.
That such a lawyer would serve the defendant's needs might seem to us
at best irrelevant and at worst counterproductive. If an African-American
defendant wanted free rein to select defense counsel in order to choose one
who would tell the story of slavery during his burglary trial, that desire
would not strike most American legal professionals as an argument in favor
of liberal lawyer-selection rules. But, that is because the American criminal
justice system is mature and its legitimacy has been established. It and other
well-established domestic criminal justice systems can be confident that
their task is a narrow, legal one: to determine if Defendant A committed
Crime B at Time C and Location D, and nothing more. All else is irrelevant.
320.
Recent Case, Criminal Law-Sixth Amendment-Ninth Circuit Affirms Denial of
Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski's Request to Represent Himself at Trial, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1253, 1254 (2002) (reporting that the Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski, pled guilty when his
lawyer insisted on presenting mental competency evidence and the court refused to allow him
to self-represent); Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Physically Present Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 313, 331-32, 335 (2010) (reporting that Long Island Railroad shooter
Colin Ferguson elected to represent himself when his lawyers wanted to raise an insanity
defense).
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The ICTY-particularly at its inception-could have had no such confidence either in itself or in its mission. It was weak and vulnerable;
defendants viewed it with hostility, and outside observers viewed it with
skepticism. Although not every defendant sought to challenge the tribunal
or refocus the lens through which the crimes were viewed, in order to retain
whatever small measure of legitimacy the early ICTY had, it had to afford
every defendant the opportunity to do so. That is, although allowing defendants free rein to hire, fire, or eschew counsel gave rise to substantial
costs, those costs were worth incurring in the early days of the ICTY because restricting defendants' choices would have been costlier still. It was
problematic enough to establish an international criminal tribunal when
none had been established during the preceding half century of atrocities.
It was problematic enough to bring before that tribunal low-level defendants who were prosecuted solely because they were capable of being
apprehended when higher-level, more culpable offenders were not. Given
these problematic features, the tribunal could not afford in addition to
create the appearance of muzzling defendants either by adopting judgedriven, nonadversarial procedures, or worse still, by rigorously regulating
the lawyer selection and withdrawal process. Even as late as 2005, Mirjan
Damagka criticized the decision to impose counsel on Milogevi6, cautioning
that "an adolescent justice system

. . .

with still fragile legitimacy should be

concerned" with the perception of unfairness. 321 Concern about that perception of unfairness was all the more pervasive and justified during the
ICTY's earliest years, and it understandably drove the tribunal's hands-off
approach to counsel matters.
During the ensuing years, the tribunal gained legitimacy and credibility. Allegations of selectivity and bias diminished to some degree
as the tribunal prosecuted members of each of the ethnic groups involved
in the conflict. Although a substantial proportion of citizens from the
former Yugoslavia continue to distrust and oppose the tribunal's work,322
that distrust and opposition have declined over the years. 323 The states of
the former Yugoslavia became far more inclined to cooperate with the
tribunal by sharing information, 324 by searching for suspected war
321.
322.

Damagka, supra note 172, at 4.
Clark, supra note 246, at 483; ORENTLICHER, supra note 18, at 18.
323.
A poll of Serbian citizens showed, for instance, that whereas sixty-four percent of
Serbians considered the ICTY a threat to Serbia in 2000, forty percent did in 2003. Igor
Bandovi6, Remarks oflgor Bandovi6, in MAKING A DIFFERENCE, supra note 264, at 95.

324.
See ICTY President, Seventh Annual Report of the InternationalTribunalfor the
Prosecution of Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, transmitted by Note of the
Secretary-General, [ 67-68, 74, U.N. Doc. A/65/205-S/2010/413 (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter ICTY 2010 Report]; Letter Dated 1 November 2010 from the President of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex II,
67-70, 75, U.N. Doc.
S/2010/588 (Nov. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Prosecutor's 2010 Security Council Report]. But see
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criminals, 325 and by turning over those suspects once apprehended.3 26 Further, whereas the early days of the tribunal saw widespread denial of the

crimes both by government officials and ordinary citizens, in recent years,
that denial has begun to give way. After years of denying that atrocities took
place in Srebrenica, 327 for instance, in 2003, the Republika Srpska (RS) set
up a commission to investigate the events of Srebrenica. 328 The commission
found that nearly 8000 people were killed in Srebrenica in July 1995, leading the RS government to issue a formal apology for the killings. 329 Public
and governmental acceptance of other Serb crimes has also increased, albeit
not dramatically. 330 Serbian journalist Ljiljana Smajlovi6 asserts as a general
matter, however, that the "'findings of the Tribunal are more accepted now'
than during earlier periods"; consequently, "the public now 'accepts that
Serbs committed enormous crimes.' "331
Arguably even more important is that the tribunal's status in the international community has also improved during these years, as it obtained
custody over more and more of its indictees and prosecuted them in proceedings that appeared to largely comply with well-established due process
norms. Concededly, certain aspects of the tribunal's proceedings have been
criticized on human rights grounds, 332 but the proceedings as a whole-and
id. 11 71-73 (reporting that the prosecution's long-standing request to Croatia for military
documents regarding Operation Storm remains outstanding).
325.
By most accounts, Serbia eventually made a credible effort to locate the ICTY's
most notorious outstanding indictee, Ratko Mladid, possibly in light of calls by the ICTY
Prosecutor to intensify those. See ICTY 2010 Report, supra note 324, 70; Prosecutor's 2010
61-66; Serbia Requests Interpol Help in Search
Security Council Report, supra note 324,
for Mladi6, BALKAN INSIGHT, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbiarequests-interpol-help-in-search-for-mladic.
326.
See ORENTLICHER, supra note 18, at 33-35; ORENTLICHER, supra note 26, at 30.
327.
ORENTLICHER, supra note 18, at 63; Marlise Simons, Officers Say Bosnian
Massacre Was Deliberate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/12/
world/officers-say-bosnian-massacre-was-deliberate.html?scp=l&sq=officers%20say%20bosnian
%20massacre%20was%20deliberate&st=cse ("[Plersistent denials on the part of the Bosnian
Serbs, including a recent government report maintaining that most of the men found in mass
graves-many with their hands tied behind their backs-were killed in combat."); Emir
Suljagid, Truth at the Hague, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/01/
opinion/truth-at-the-hague.html?scp=1 &sq=Truth%20at%20the%20Hague&st=cse.
See ORENTLICHER, supra note 26, at 95.
328.
329.

Id. at 95.
See id. at 91-97; ORENTLICHER, supra note 18, at 50.
ORENTLICHER, supra note 18, at 19 (quoting journalist Ljiljana Smajlovid). As
331.
Serbian human rights lawyer Bogdan Ivanigevi6 puts it, Serbs who persist in denying Serbian
crimes are now "from the margins." Id. at 63.
332.
Some commentators maintain that the tribunal's sometimes lengthy pretrial detentions may violate the defendants' right to an expeditious trial. E.g., SAFFERLING, supra note
40, at 147; Hafida Lahiouel, The Right of the Accused to an Expeditious Trial, in ESSAYS ON
ICTY PROCEDURE, supra note 3, at 197; Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of the Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 541, 543 (2004); see also ZAPPALA, supra note 55, at
252. See generally Megan Fairlie, The Marriageof Common and Continental Law at the ICTY
and Its Progeny,Due ProcessDeficit, 4 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 243, 291-93 (2004).

330.
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in particular the healthy number of acquittals those proceedings have produced 33 3-- depict a criminal justice system that seeks to advance worthy
penological goals while respecting the defendants' fair trial rights.334 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the tribunal's legitimacy and credibility
grew when the principles that motivated its creation were carried forward
through the establishment first of the ICTR, then of the permanent ICC, and
now of a host of other ad hoc international tribunals that prosecute recent
and distant atrocities. The creation of these institutions both propelled and
vindicated the ideal that international crimes can and should be prosecuted.
Thus, what began primarily as a political move, a fig leaf concealing Western apathy, has grown and matured into a legitimate legal and political
force. New atrocities routinely give rise to calls for international criminal
justice,335 and although few of those calls lead to the creation of new international tribunals or cases before the ICC, they nonetheless increase the
likelihood that other accountability mechanisms will be pursued.336 They
also reflect the now widespread expectation that international crimes will

333.
The ICTY has acquitted the following defendants either at trial or on appeal: Ljube
Bolkoski, Prosecutor v. Boikoski & Tar~ulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgement, 606
(July 10, 2008); Zejnil Delalic, Prosecutor v. Delali6 et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement,
721 (Nov. 16, 1998); Fatmir Limaj and Isak Musliu, Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala & Musliu,
Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgement,
740, 743 (Nov. 30, 2005), aff'd, Case No. IT-03-66-A,
Judgement,
275, 314-15, 344-47 (Sept. 27, 2007); Sefer Halilovid, Prosecutor v. Halilovi6,
Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgement, 753 (Nov. 16, 2005); Ramush Haradinaj and Idriz Balaj,
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgement, IT 502-03 (Apr.
3, 2008), partial re-trial ordered, Case No. IT-04-84-A, Judgement, 377 (July 19, 2010);
Dragan Papi6, Zoran Kupregki6, Mirjan Kupregki6, and Vlatko Kupretkid, Prosecutor v.
Kupregki6 et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, 769 (Jan. 14, 2000), rev'd in part, Case No. IT-9516-A, Judgement, at 168-69 (Oct. 23, 2001); Milan Milutinovi6, Prosecutor v. Milutinovid et
al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgement, q 284 (Feb. 26, 2009); Miroslav Radi6, Prosecutor v.
Mrkgi6, Radi6 & ljivan~anin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgement, 714 (Sept. 27, 2007);
Naser Ori6, Prosecutor v. Orid, Case. No. IT-03-68-A, Judgement, at 64 (July 3, 2008).
334.
My recent book, NANCY A. COMBS, FACTFINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2010), calls
into question the fact-finding capabilities of certain international tribunals, but my research did
not encompass the ICTY and furthermore was not available when the tribunal was gaining in
credibility and legitimacy.
335.
See, e.g., Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Rep. of
the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human Rights Council, 12th
Sess., 1772, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "BECAUSE
THEY HAVE THE GUNS...

I'm LEFT WITH NOTHING.": THE PRICE OF CONTINUING IMPUNITY

IN C6TE D'IvOIRE 35 (May 2006); Public Statement, Amnesty Int'l, Myanmar: UN General

Assembly Should Call for Commission of Inquiry, Al Index ASA 16/011/2010 (Sept. 3,
2010); Public Statement, Amnesty Int'l, Sri Lanka: The ACF Case 4 Years On: Sri Lankan
Families Still Waiting for Justice, Al Index ASA 37/012/2010 (Aug. 19, 2010); Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Officials Say About 500 Were Victims of Congo Rapes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2010,
at A8; Marlise Simons, PalestiniansPressfor War Crimes Inquiry on Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2009, at Al3.
336.
These measures might include truth commissions, civil remedies, or both.
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generate a credible response. 3 37 International criminal law has come of age,
and the now mature and legitimate ICTY stands as its foundation.
Once this foundational evolution was underway, the procedural and defense counsel evolutions described herein were able to commence. It was
appropriate when the tribunal was an extraordinarily weak and vulnerable
institution to vest in the parties maximum process control. Doing so both
accorded with the ideological assumptions underlying the tribunal and
helped to legitimate the tribunal by enhancing its reputation for fairness.
Once the tribunal had gained a measure of legitimacy and credibility, however, the judges could reduce the defendants' process control as a means of
advancing other valuable ends. Thus, the judges reformed pretrial and trial
procedures in order to expedite proceedings, even though doing so transferred some process control from the defendants to the judges. Likewise, the
judges limited defendants' ability to fire their counsel and to self-represent
for the same reasons, and they imposed reasonable experience and qualifications requirements on defense counsel to improve the quality of
representation that defendants receive. These reforms were uncontroversial
in themselves both because they were moderate in scope and because they
were undertaken to meet pressing needs, but they were both conditioned
upon and reflect the most fundamental and controversial evolution of all:
the evolution that transformed international criminal justice from a passing
novelty into a respected accountability mechanism that appears to be here to
stay.
CONCLUSION

In the domestic context, large-scale procedural reforms, including those
involving the regulation of defense counsel, typically both reflect and instantiate large-scale social, political, and cultural conditions in the society
in question. For instance, although American pretrial procedures had for
decades (if not longer) operated in a discriminatory manner that disadvantaged the poor and racial minorities, it was only following a marked
evolution in the country's views on racial discrimination that the Supreme
Court was able to set in motion the due process revolution that transformed
the American criminal justice system.338 Similarly, the introduction of lawyers into criminal trials in eighteenth-century England was driven by a
desire to curb the perjury that had become prevalent in those trials,33 9 but
that introduction was possible only because of a seventeenth-century change
in political theory in which the dominant conception of the citizen as subor337.
338.

See sources cited supra note 335.
Barry C. Feld, The Politics of Race andJuvenile Justice: The "Due ProcessRevolution" and the Conservative Reaction, 20 JUST. Q. 765, 765-66 (2003); see J. SCOTT HARR &
KAREN

2002).
339.
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dinate to the crown was replaced by notions of equality and procedural opportunity. 340 We can see, then, that domestic procedural reforms typically
occur when a problem arises in a political and social context that recognizes
it as a problem and sees its remedy as consistent with its aims and
41
worldview.
Similar conditions surround procedural reforms in the international
context. The problem sought to be remedied by many of the ICTY's procedural reforms was the excessive length of trials. This is a problem that any
criminal justice system would desire to ameliorate, but the political context
in which the ICTY then operated rendered the problem in acute need of a
remedy. In particular, soon after it began providing the international tribunals with the funds necessary to carry out their mandates, the international
community made clear its unwillingness to continue such funding
indefinitely. It thereby compelled the ICTY and ICTR to adopt completion
strategies that called upon the tribunals to close their doors within relatively
short time spans.3 42 In order to carry out their completion strategies, the tribunals abandoned certain investigations, transferred cases to certain
domestic courts, and increased their efforts to obtain guilty pleas from defendants. 34 3 The procedural reforms described herein thus were not formally
mandated by the tribunals' completion strategies, but they were undertaken
in a political context that was particularly amenable to such reforms.
What this Article has shown is that whereas such a favorable political
context may be a necessary condition for large-scale political reform, it is
not a sufficient condition. The ICTY's initial and acute institutional weakness compelled it initially to adopt certain obviously suboptimal procedural
rules and defense counsel regulations. As the years passed, the tribunal
adopted more advantageous procedural rules and defense counsel regulations, and on the surface these appeared to stem directly from the difficulties
engendered by the initial rules. This Article has shown, however, that the
relationship is far more complicated. Specifically, it was only when the tribunal had been strengthened and legitimated-in part by the very
procedural rules and defense counsel regulations that it sought to abandon-that the tribunal could adopt procedural rules and defense counsel
regulations that enabled it both to fulfill its own mandate and launch the
international criminal justice revolution that has transformed international
law and global politics.
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